A Defense of First-Personal Phenomenological Experience: Responses to Sticker and Saunders

Jeanine Grenberg

Resumen


In this paper, I respond to questions Sticker and Saunders raise about integrating third-personal interactions within my phenomenological first-personal account of moral obligatedness.  Sticker argues that third-personal interactions are more central for grounding moral obligatedness than I admit.  Saunders turns things around and suggests we might not even be able to access third-personal interactions with others at the level one would need to in order to secure proper moral interactions with them. I argue in response that both these challenges misunderstand something about my phenomenological first-personal account of the grounding of moral obligation.  Sticker assumes that I make absolutely no room for third-personal interactions as important for morality, but that is not the case.  And Saunders assumes that first-, second- and third-personal interactions demand phenomenological access to oneself and others as transcendentally free, but I deny that claim.  I will consider each of these challenges in turn.


Palabras clave


Kant; Phenomenology; First-Personal

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Referencias


Grenberg, J. (2013) Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account (Cambridge University Press).

Grenberg, J. (2017) 'The Practical, Cognitive Import of Feeling: A Phenomenological Account' in Kelly Sorensen and Diane Williamson, eds (2017) Kant and the Faculty of Feeling (Cambridge University Press).

Grenberg, J. (forthcoming) 'Free, First-Personal Moral Education' in Educational Philosophy and Theory.)

Saunders, J. (2016) 'Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism and the Third-Person' in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24.2, pp. 164-82.

Sticker, M. (2016) 'Kant on Engaging Other Agents and Observing Reason at Work' in History of Philosophy Quarterly, 33.4, pp. 347-373.




DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2384645

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