The 'Ought' and the 'Can'

Katerina Deligiorgi

Resumen


Kant’s ethics is objectivist. Like other objectivist ethics, it faces the problem of showing how what is objectively morally demanded hooks onto the moral deliberations of particular individuals. The issue is particularly acute for Kantian ethics given the centrality of the concept of autonomy, which expresses a demand for rational self-legislation. The paper focuses on the ‘ought implies can principle’ (OIC) and its role in Kant’s ethics. The argument shows how understanding the Kantian use of OIC helps also with the problem of establishing a link between individual deliberation and objective moral demands.


Palabras clave


Kant; autonomy; freedom; morality

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Referencias


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2384006

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