Transcendental Freedom and its Discontents

Joe Saunders


This introduction briefly lays out the basics of Kant’s concept, transcendental freedom, and some of its discontents. It also provides an overview of the dossier itself, introducing Katerina Deligiorgi’s discussion of ought-implies-can, Patrick Frierson’s account of degrees of responsibility, and Jeanine Grenberg’s treatment of the third-person.

Palabras clave

Kant; Freedom; Transcendental Idealism

Texto completo:



Blӧser, C. (2015) 'Degrees of Responsibility in Kant's Practical Philosophy' in Kantian Review, 20.2, pp. 183-209.

Deligiorgi, K. (2018) 'The 'Ought' and the 'Can'' in Con-textos Kantianos

Grenberg, J. (2013) Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account (Cambridge University Press).

Saunders, J. (2016) 'Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism and the Third-Person' in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24.2, pp. 164-82.

Saunders, J. (2018) 'Kant and Degrees of Responsibility' in Journal of Applied Philosophy Schiller, F. (1943-) 'Über Anmut und Wurde' in Lieselotte Blumenthal and Benno von Wiese, Schillers Werke Nationalausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger).

Sticker, M. (2016) 'Kant on Engaging Other Agents and Observing Reason at Work' in History of Philosophy Quarterly, 33.4, pp.347-73.


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ISSN: 2386-7655


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