Kant on Cosmopolitan Education for Peace

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Abstract

Kant sees the gradual implementation of a cosmopolitan world order as necessary for securing peace at national and international level. However, he seems to be overoptimistic about the role of states and other political institutions in securing coordination and peace. In some passages Kant claims that a just juridical framework alone, as long as it is efficiently enforced, is enough to secure a large scale coordination of individual’s agency and a maximal protection of individual freedom.

As I will show, other passages suggest that ethical motivation also has an important role to play in the achievement of peace and the implementation of a cosmopolitan world order. This is because good laws alone may produce “good citizens” (who do not infringe the law), but still does not make possible effective political participation and the necessary attitude required for the implementation and improvement of political institutions at national and international level. I will discuss Kant’s claim that education must have a cosmopolitan character as well as the duty of states to create responsible citizens, not only at domestic but also at international level.

Keywords

Kant, Cosmopolitanism, Citizenship, Education, Peace

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I. “There shall be no war”  

In his political writings Kant often stresses the role of political institutions for the achievement of peace. However, Kant's focus on institutional cosmopolitanism seems to make the role of ethical motivation and consequently of the education of individual agents if not superfluous then at least unclear.

In this paper, I will argue that the creation of the cosmopolitan juridical apparatus required for securing international peace depends on the formation of individuals who are able to view themselves as belonging to a wider community than the societies in which they were born, i.e., as citizens of the world. The promotion of peace therefore requires education in cosmopolitan values. However, cosmopolitan education should not be restricted to learning cosmopolitan ideals: it also requires providing the tools for active political engagement and the necessary attitude required for political change in one’s own society. This will include historical awareness and the development of critical thinking. But the implementation of a cosmopolitan curriculum for education for peace will face several obstacles, the hardest of all being the political reservations of non-liberal states to cosmopolitan ideals. As a matter of common knowledge, national civil education has often been used as an instrument of oppression. Instead of promoting autonomous, well-informed individuals, children are deliberately made intellectually impaired to ensure their allegiance to and subordination within conservative hierarchical societies. How can the idea of the equality, freedom and independence of all human beings, the core principles of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right, be consistently taught parallel to state endorsed views such as that girls are less valuable citizens or that people from different religions or nationalities are not worthy of respect or no persons at all? The discrepancy between the Kantian universal ideals implicit in the notion of cosmopolitan education and national civic education as supporting the

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2 MS 6:354, Kant’s writings are cited according to the volume: page number of the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant’s Complete Works (1902-, Gesammelte Schriften, Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter). I use the following abbreviations for the individual works cited:  
  - IAG 'Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht' (Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent);  
  - MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals);  
  - PA Kant on Pädagogik (Kant on Pedagogy).  
  - ZeF Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf'. (Toward Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch).  
  - SF Der Streit der Fakultäten (The Conflict of the Faculties).
Specific culture and values of a society led to the view that international education for peace is nothing more than a camouflaged version of western imperialism. Does it make sense to speak of a universal education for peace in a world of segregation and cultural diversity? In this paper I will address the following questions:

1. Does Kant’s institutional understanding of cosmopolitanism make civic education superfluous? If not, what is the role of civic education for the achievement of peace in Kant’s theory of right?
2. Does cosmopolitan education undermine culture and the special ties of individuals?
3. Is it possible to reconcile cosmopolitan education with citizenship of a specific nation?

The first question is has a clear scholarly motivation: to determine the place and role of civic education within Kant’s theory of cosmopolitan right, which strongly stresses the need for political institutions for securing peace. However, the answer to this question will enable us to develop a Kantian approach to the questions of the legitimacy and compatibility of cosmopolitan education, as an education in universal ideals, with multiculturalism and the membership to a particular country. These questions are interesting not only for the Kant scholar, but for political theorists and peace practitioners in general.

As I will show, Kant’s lesson here is that public criticism of one’s country’s policies (the exercise of freedom of speech) should not be understood as a threat to particular states, but as a requirement of active citizenship, and consequently, as a civic duty. I will discuss how Kant deals with the apparent inconsistency between cosmopolitan ideals and the commitment to a particular state. The concern for justice at international level, which is the object of a cosmopolitan oriented education for peace, will have thus a positive impact at domestic level, in which it promotes the consistency and improvement of states policies and institutions.

II. The Kantian State and Political Cosmopolitanism
According to Immanuel Kant, the promotion of peace between nations is not merely a matter of philanthropy or ethics. It is a matter of right (MS 6:352). As Kant stresses, the need to regulate the interactions between nations has to do with the fact that humans have to share the surface of the earth and its resources. Since we are confined to a limited space within the *the globus terraqueus*, there is not only the possibility of physical interaction between nations (such as commercial relations) but also the possibility of conflict. Let’s now imagine a hypothetical original situation, before the creation of states, where individuals are free to settle down wherever they want on the surface of the planet. In principle, no one has more right than anyone else to a certain part of the earth than others. It is therefore natural to think that whoever occupies and makes use of a certain patch of land for the first time has a claim to it (the principle of original acquisition). However, since the original community of land is still not a rightful one (there is no global system of laws regulating occupation of land and property rights), there can be no peremptory but only *provisory* possession of land or goods in a society.\(^3\) It is only after regulating property relations through the implementation of norms which are equally valid and binding for everyone that there can be a fully justified duty of others to respect my possession of an object or piece of land. In turn, I am equally obliged to respect other people’s possessions. Following the rights tradition before him, Kant calls the original state in which property relations are not regulated by a common system of norms the *state of nature*. Analogous to individuals, nations also find themselves in the *state of nature*, until a corresponding juridical framework is created to regulate and sanction interactions between nations at the international level.

Reason can provide related nations with no other means for emerging from the state of lawlessness, which consists solely of war, than that they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, just as individual persons do, and, by accommodating themselves to the constraints of common law, establish a nation of peoples (*civitas gentium*) that (continually growing) will finally include all the people of the earth. (ZeF 8: 357)

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\(^3\) Provisionality signalises that the conditions under which acquisition can be fully binding to everyone on the globe have not yet been achieved. Therefore, “provisional” does not mean that a certain claim right is merely temporary or transitional, but that its justification is forward-looking i.e., “in expectation” of a future civil condition in which alone it can be omnilaterally binding. See my “Private Property and Territorial Rights: A Kantian Alternative to Contemporary Debates” in R. Demiray and A. Pinheiro Walla (eds.), *Reason, Normativity and Law: New Essays in Kantian Philosophy* (forthcoming).
Kant’s theory of rights is spells out the rational conditions for external freedom and acquisition. War, Kant stresses, is the wrong way to seek one’s rights. Right can only be properly secured and enforced through right itself. It is therefore necessary to abandon the state of nature and work towards the implementation of a lawful condition not only within a single society, but also at international level. (MS 6:354). Unless there is an omnilaterally binding juridical framework i.e. a constitution binding individuals and nations to respect each other’s rights, including claims to territory, these rights cannot be properly regulated and enforced at international and domestic level.

As nations, peoples can be regarded as single individuals who injure one another through their close proximity while living in the state of nature (i.e., independently of external laws). For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each. (ZeF 8: 354)

Kant offers two different versions of cosmopolitanism: a moral and a political one. Moral cosmopolitanism is based on the participation of all humans qua rational beings in a moral community. It does not presuppose the existence of a transnational state for citizenship: humans are seen as equals on the basis of their rational status and have therefore certain obligations to each other regardless of nationality, gender or creed. This conception is embedded in Kant’s moral theory. On the other hand, the political conception of cosmopolitanism is based on Kant’s theory of right, i.e., on the formal conditions for the interaction of individuals considered as equally free. If individuals are equally free, the freedom of everyone matters; it follows that no one should have the right to exercise her own agency while undermining the agency of others. It is therefore a requirement of reason that we should not only protect the freedom of individuals against arbitrary interference but also try to reconcile individual’s actions systematically, so that the agency of a plurality of individuals becomes compatible with each other. This is how Kant shows why we need to enter a civil condition: in order to coordinate external freedom individuals must submit to a general authority capable of enforcing a univocal system of norms binding for everyone with coercive powers. Analogously, the need to abandon the state of nature at international level (in the relations between nations) means that the relations between states must be regulated through the implementation of international juridical institutions.
Cosmopolitan law (*Weltbürgerrecht*) is the minimal, unwritten code (based on original right) regulating the relations between states and individuals, which are still not covered by legal agreements between nations\(^4\). For Kant, there can be no real peace within a nation if peace is not first secured at international level, for the continuous external danger will lead states to invest their resources not in their own cultural and social improvement but on preparations for war. (IAG 8:24) In order to achieve peace at international level, Kant proposes the creation of a league or federation of states. (ZeF 8:356, IAG 8:24). Although in some passages Kant suggests that the league of states should be based merely on its members voluntary compliance, in other passages he argues that it should have the power to coerce other nations to comply with the terms of international law.\(^5\)

Kant often stresses the crucial role of constitutions for the achievement of right and peace. In fact, he often seems to think that all we need for securing peace are good laws, properly enforced. Good citizenship does not depend on the subject’s moral virtue or character, but merely on an adequate and well functioning system of laws. This view is reinforced by Kant’s strict distinction between *ethics* and *right*. While ethics is concerned with the motives and maxims underlying the conduct of an agent (the agent’s *Gesinnung*), right is restricted to the external compatibility of an action with the actions of other agents, regardless of the individual’s motives for the action. As long as my action is consistent with positive laws, it does not matter, from the perspective of right, if what I did was out of self-interest or from a moral motive. The only relevant aspect of my action is that it does not infringe external laws. Right also abstracts from the particular ends different agents may chose to pursue. It aims at coordinating mutually compatible actions of a plurality of individuals within a system. Kant suggests that it is possible to make good citizens even out of a nation of *devils*.

As hard as it may sound, the problem of organizing a nation is solvable even for a people

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\(^4\) It is important to note that Kant uses the term “Nationen” in a broader sense and does not merely include modern states as possible members of an international community, regulated by cosmopolitan law. Kant refers to American indigenous groups as being nations (*amerikanischen Nationen*, MS 6:353) and thus as possible members of the future international legal order.

comprised of devils (if only they possess understanding). (...) For it does not require the moral improvement of man; it requires only that we know how to apply the mechanism of nature to men so as to organize the conflict of hostile attitudes present in people in such a way that they must compel one another to submit to coercive laws and thus enter into a state peace, where laws have power. (ZeF 8: 366)

Kant seems to be overconfident about the role of juridical frameworks for securing peace, at least at national level. However, as he acknowledges, humanity is still far from achieving a perfect constitution, even less at international level. This might remain an ideal that we may never fully realize, although we are morally obliged to pursue it and should never dismiss it (MS 6:354). The implementation of international right remains a generational task: it has to be gradually implemented and improved through the insights and hard work of several generations. This is where education, and more precisely, a cosmopolitan oriented education enters the picture, playing a crucial role for the implementation of just political structures and the promotion of peace at international level. Since juridical systems are still evolving both domestically and internationally, it is imperative to form the citizens that will shape the future world order, especially in those societies affected by or involved in war.

Kant also stresses the role of active citizenship and freedom of speech within a state. A citizen in the active sense must understand herself as a legislating member of a society. This implies being able to make use of public reason, i.e., of communicating one’s thoughts and criticisms of the system as a public person (a person who is interested in promoting the public good, not merely pursuing her private interests) or running for public office. But active citizenship cannot be achieved by a purely repressive system of laws, which makes infringements impossible. A good citizen in this case would be good merely in a negative sense, because she does not violate the law as a matter of fact. It is hard to imagine how Kant's nation of devils could produce good citizens in a positive sense, who are actively engaged in the promotion of the res publica. I assume that Kant has in mind a hypothetical, perfectly good constitution, a constitution which needs no further improvement and is perfectly just. But existing constitutions are far from ideal and thus

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6 Kant’s aim in the nation of devils example is to argue that his ideal of external laws is feasible, given the
require the political engagement of its citizens. And active citizenship, I will argue, requires not only civic, but a genuinely cosmopolitan education.

III. Cosmopolitan Education for Peace

Civic education has traditionally been understood as instruction for becoming a citizen of a given country. Thus the principles transmitted in civic education may vary radically, depending on the kind of society it serves. A hierarchical society requires other civic values than a liberal society. As Kant argues, although education should provide the tools for children to succeed in the societies they live in, it should have an essentially cosmopolitan character. Children should learn to care not only about their particular present situation, but also to have in mind their membership in and commitments to Humanity as a whole. As Kant notes, the problem is that parents are only concerned about their children’s advantage in society, corrupt as it may be, while the state’s only aim is to produce the kind of citizens it can best use as means to its own purposes (PA 9:448). To make children aware of the common end of humanity as a whole is the only way to overcome the short-sighted instrumentalist education of parents and states and to promote civic friendship. Interestingly, Kant suggests that a cosmopolitan oriented education has positive effects also at the domestic level. He seems to believe that the commitment to humanity at large does not undermine but rather reinforces some of our commitments to the states we belong to as citizens. I will come back to this point later, in section four.

Kant equally stresses the need for general public education, as opposed to private instruction (häusliche Erziehung). Kant’s point is not only a criticism of exclusivist education, only available to a privileged few. He thinks that education must be a coherent

imperfections and limitations of human nature. He is addressing the objection raised against his legal theory that it would require agents to be like angels, that is, morally perfect agents. Kant’s point is to show that if even a people of devils could be led to behave well under a system of external laws, so can human beings, who are neither perfect like angels nor evil like devils. The point I am making in this article is neither aimed at angels nor at devils, but to human agents under imperfect civil conditions, faced with international conflicts due to the persistence of a state of nature at international level.

7 What Kant is proposing here is not that individuals should be educated and set themselves to improve Humankind or try to make people happy: what he has in mind is the respect of the rights of individuals, which is own to all peoples regardless of whether they are our co-nationals, share the same religious views and of their gender.

8 PA 9:448.

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system and that this can only be achieved by means of consistent state planning and support (SF 7:93). Further, Kant argues that public education is necessary to complement private education and counteract the lacks and mistakes which are inculcated in children through their families at home (PA 9:453) and that it is part of a states’ duties to bear the costs for public education (IAG 8:26, SF 7:92-93). As a matter of fact, basic education is still beyond the reach of millions of children in the world, and with it, also cosmopolitan education for peace. Precarious school conditions such as the lack of school rooms and materials, long walking distances, poverty and discrimination against girls and young women are still an impediment for children and youths in many parts of the world to basic education. As Kant acknowledges, the beginning of general schooling will depend from the efforts of private persons (PA 9:449), but since education is a necessary condition for active citizenship, it is a duty of states to promote the education of its citizens. General education should thus gradually become a public matter.

Kant’s ideal of a cosmopolitan education has been defended by authors such as Martha Nussbaum and is embedded in the discussion between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum’s view has faced many objections specially from communitarians. A common argument against the notion of a cosmopolitan oriented education is its “abstract character,” which ignores the particularities of the cultures in which individuals live. Children are thereby led to disregard their family ties and personal relationships and finally become unable to develop any concrete allegiances necessary for a human life. This argument is based on the view that personal commitments and loyalties are constitutive of personal identity, whereas cosmopolitan ideals are devoid of any content and real significance for concrete individuals. In this sense, cosmopolitan education would amount to self-alienation, in which it forces us to discard our embedment in a particular society and cultural background. It is also suspiciously regarded as a disguised form of western imperialism, which aims at imposing its own parochial values on other cultures under the label of “universal ideals”. The same argument has often been used against the human rights discourse.

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9 Martha Nussbaum, 1996.
As Jeremy Waldron points out, the notion of culture to which communitarians often appeal is very vague. The understanding of single cultures as timeless and isolated, corresponding to a certain fixed territory, contradicts the constant movement and interaction which is human history. Factors such as trade, migration and transmission of ideas have always existed (although in different scales at different times) and contributed to constant interaction and mutual influence between cultures. As trade relations illustrate, societies cannot be understood as wholly independent, self-sufficient entities. Demand in one society directly influences production in others, in which it determines what is worth producing, according to the pattern of demand and supply. It is therefore not only extremely hard to delineate the boundaries of a given culture, as opposed to other cultures, but also unclear why cultures should be “protected” against external influences. It has often been noted that the tendency to exaggerate the homogeneity of a culture usually has a political motivation; it is a common phenomenon in the context of separatist and nationalist movements. In fact, individual identities nowadays often have a more complex background, involving more than one “single” culture. If this is the case, why should cosmopolitan education be seen as a threat to particular cultures and to individual identity?

As Waldron points out, there is something artificial in the dichotomy between universalism and communitarianism. All cultures show certain universalistic traits, and this is may be something we find valuable about them, even when we do not belong to the culture in question. Personal commitments and ties which have a narrow scope such as the special concern for one’s family and circle of friends can also be understood in universalistic terms, without losing their specific personal character. Further, personal attachments such as the special love and concern for one’s own children neither exclude the responsibility of adults to care for children in general nor imply that one’s own children must be favoured unconditionally, regardless of the circumstances. It is indeed healthy for parents and

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11 Idem, p.27.
13 “Since such a culture is never created out of whole cloth, since it involves the reorganization of existing cultural materials not initially given as parts of this whole, as well as the invention of new ones, the result is often a ‘multicultural culture’, with disparate and sometimes quite shallow traditions crammed together under a thin veneer of intellectual and political rationalization. Or else it is something which is not so much a distinct culture as an organized response to some (real or, more usually, imagined) threat to the integrity of a set of cultural traditions that has been cobbled together precisely to head off that threat”. Waldron, 2003, p.35.

Ibidem, p.34.
children alike to regard themselves and other people as being fundamentally equal in worth and as parts of a larger whole than one’s family and circle of friends. As a matter of consistency, this larger community should not be confined within national borders. What justifies the view that one should be specially bound to her fellow nationals while having no obligations at all to other people? As Nussbaum observes, failing to teach children a respect for other people at large is a threat to the promotion of multicultural respect within a nation.\(^\text{14}\)

Furthermore, trade relations and cultural interaction show that cosmopolitan frameworks have already existed for a long time. The UNO is neither the first nor the only available cosmopolitan structure.\(^\text{15}\) As Kant observed, interest in establishing trade relationships with one’s neighbours gave rise to the first peaceful interactions between peoples. With time, the tendency was to regulate these relations by formal agreements between the peoples. International right began to shape itself as commerce continuously stimulated the expansion of international agreements, including more and more nations. The gradual juridification of international relations would finally lead to an international civil condition, uniting all nations in the world under the rule of law.

(...) Distant parts of the of the world can establish with one another peaceful relations that will eventually become matters of public law, and the human race can gradually be brought closer and closer to a cosmopolitan constitution. (ZeF 8:3a58)

It has also been stressed that one cannot become a world citizen unless there is a corresponding world polity.\(^\text{16}\) The lack of a common political ground on which to base “world citizenship” has contributed to the view that cosmopolitanism is a fantastic idea, leading people to give up what really exists, i.e., their relations of kin and nationality. However, as I noted before, Kant had two different conceptions of cosmopolitanism, a moral and a political or institutional one. The two are by no means mutually exclusive but


\(^{15}\) Waldron, 2003, p.39.

\(^{16}\) This point was famously raised by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism: “Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself thrown out of the family of nations altogether.” Chapter 9, section II, p. 384.
rather complementary. Although the moral version of cosmopolitanism seems enough to justify and make cosmopolitan right intelligible independently of the existence of a transnational polity, the necessity to make rights binding and enforceable urges us to create cosmopolitan institutions. In this sense, cosmopolitan education does not depend on an existing cosmopolitan world order, but prescribes us a task instead: the task of creating the world in which a peaceful coexistence is possible. The world citizen is the creator of a world order that she might not be able to see fulfilled in her life time. This is because cosmopolitan peace is the work of several generations. The fact that a cosmopolitan legal order has not been fully implemented in the present generation, does not entitle us to dismiss our duties to future generations as illusory or to ignore the efforts of our ancestors towards cosmopolitan peace as vain.

IV. Civic duties: reconciling nationalism and cosmopolitanism

As Nussbaum and Waldron point out, cosmopolitan education involves more than education in moral ideals. It implies learning besides one’s own culture about other peoples’ way of life (especially about one’s neighbours), their history, and the ways people have interacted with one another in the past. Knowledge of world history as well as the development of critical and autonomous thinking are the most important requisites of a cosmopolitan education for peace. However, it is necessary that the content of education is not manipulated or distorted according to the interests of states or as an instrument of political propaganda. This is unfortunately one of the greatest challenges in our times. The promotion of historical awareness and autonomous thinking can be seen as threats to the interests of hegemonic groups and thus be extremely difficult to implement. Nevertheless, international agreements about the implementation and content of a cosmopolitan education for peace, especially in conflict affected areas, are projects worth pursuing by the international community and will depend mostly on diplomacy and political will in order to be realized.

However, one could object that there is a deeper tension between cosmopolitan ideals in education and the membership in a specific nation. This is because being the citizen of a given state implies civic duties which necessarily exclude other states and no-nationals,
and this applies even to liberal societies, whose core values coincide with those of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the commitment to a given nation seems to limit the commitment to humanity at large, independently of cultural differences.

Pauline Kleingeld argued that Kant’s theory of the state does not merely allow but indeed requires a certain form of patriotism. Kant understands civic patriotism as political participation on behalf of a commonwealth (res publica)\(^{17}\). Because Kant assigns a special role to active citizenship with a state, Kant’s theory of the state implies that citizens must have special duties towards their states, duties which necessarily exclude allegiance to other countries and favour one’s co-nationals.\(^{18}\) Nevertheless, Kant’s practical theory enables us to reconcile these duties with the duties towards others as moral persons and fellow citizens of the world. This makes Kant’s theory worthy of attention.

The duty of civic patriotism for Kant is the duty of citizens to promote just institutions in their states. The ways to comply with this duty will vary according to the situation and talents of individuals: it can take the form of active participation in public debate about state policies, running for public offices or promoting culture and education. It is therefore not possible to specify for every person how she should comply with civic duty. The civic duty of patriotism is therefore an imperfect duty.

Imperfect duties are characterized by a certain latitude, which enables agents to determine how to comply with the duty (even though it is not up to them to free themselves from the duty altogether). For instance, the duty of benevolence can be discharged in different ways: by donating money to a charity, by helping an elderly neighbour or a friend in need, doing voluntary community work etc…An agent’s decision about how to comply with the duty will rely on contingent factors of her life such as personal abilities, financial situation and social environment. In contrast, a perfect duty will leave no space for decision: we have a duty not to harm, kill or lie to all persons at all times. In this sense, imperfect duties must yield to perfect ones: if the choice is between being kind to someone and avoiding inflicting physical harm to someone else, it is clear that the latter perfect duty will have

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\(^{17}\) Kleingeld, 2003, p.303.

\(^{18}\) Idem, p.309.
Kant on Cosmopolitan Education for Peace

priority over the former imperfect one.

As Kleingeld argues, the duty of civic patriotism is not primarily a duty to favour one’s compatriots and one’s state, although this will be often be a consequence of it. Civic patriotism for Kant is in the first place the commitment to promote the implementation of public justice within one’s state. Patriotic duties are necessary for maintaining and improving imperfect juridical institutions. They are directly linked to the ideal of a just republic in Kant’s theory of right. However, if a duty of citizens to their states violates a perfect duty to humanity at large, then we have an obligation to comply with our duties to the right of humanity instead. Our commitment to cosmopolitan right allows us to query the national duty in question. In this sense, cosmopolitan education is beneficial at domestic level. Not to lose sight of the right of humanity as a whole enables us not only to reconcile the policies of a nation with international and cosmopolitan right, but also to promote the internal consistency of legal systems and policies at national level. This may be openly against the private interests of some powerful groups, but is in the greater interest of the nation as a whole, in the long term.

Cosmopolitan education does not require rejecting one’s family bonds, cultural or religious ancestry or allegiance to one’s country. But it gives children the necessary tools for evaluating and criticising the policies of their own and other states at national and international level and is a powerful means to the promotion of peace. Kant’s lesson here is that public criticism of one’s country’s policies (the exercise of freedom of speech) should not be seen as a threat to the state, but as an expression of civic patriotism. To be a good citizen of a nation is not to blindly glorify one’s country but to work towards the improvement of justice within one’s state. But this will require that its relations to other nations are also just. Therefore, the concern for international justice and with it the implementation of a cosmopolitan education are beneficial not only at international level. They help promote the coherence of legal systems and policies at domestic level and thus promote justice also within particular states.

Cosmopolitan education for peace is education in cultural difference but also in the equal

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rights of individuals across national borders. It teaches us our real commitments: the commitment to justice. This is why a citizen of the world will also be a good citizen of a particular state.

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Kant on Cosmopolitan Education for Peace


