Kantian Appearance as an Objective–Objectual Representation

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Abstract

This paper analyses the features of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (or Kant’s transcendentalism), which Kant himself described as transcendental idealism. On the one hand, Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. On the other hand, our ‘mode of cognition’ [Critique, B25] cognition is representative in that it is based on representations — subjective and objective (objectual) ones. A synthesis of the above considerations suggests that Kant’s transcendentalism rests on the conceptual triad “[objective] object (thing in itself; Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — and [mental] representation (Vorstellung)”. Kant’s transcendentalism is impossible without the ‘premise’ of appearance (a paraphrase of Jacobi’s maxim). The correct interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy should keep the double difference of appearance both from thing–in–itself and representation. In this transcendental triad, the Kantian appearance has an intermediate status since it is located between objective things and subjective representations. However, the conceptual (ontological and epistemological) status of the appearance needs to be clarified, since Kant himself does not give a clear answer to this question, and at present there are several interpretations, differing primarily in the definition of the concept of the appearance (the contemporary confrontation of the theory of “two objects” and theory of “two aspects” is a paradigmatic example of it). For me, appearance can be correlated with objective–objectual (gegenständlich) representation. It would be unwise to identify appearance with thing in itself, which was characteristic of pre–Kantian philosophy (naïve realism), or appearance with representation, which was the case in phenomenalist interpretations of transcendental idealism à la Berkley (theory of ‘two objects’). The Kantian appearance, as emphasised in BXXVII of his Critique, is an appearance of an object, which — although implicitly

1 This is the advanced/extended text of my talk on the transcendental workshop “Transcendental turn in philosophy (2): Kant’s appearance, its nature, ontological and epistemological status” (Moscow, April 27, 2017, https://phil.hse.ru/plc/trans2017; see: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=30566050 (in Russian)).

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— suggests a semantic relationship of reference. In this case, the appearance is not an object, but just ‘a designation (or sign) of an object’ [Critique, B235]. Appearance (as a sign) is impossible without what appears in it (the referent of a sign). This paper puts forward a number of arguments in favour of the objectual (objective–objectual) status of Kant’s concept of appearance.

**Keywords**

Transcendental philosophy (transcendentalism), appearance, theory of two worlds, theory of two aspects, theory of appearance, theory of appearing.

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1. In his February 21, 1772 famous letter to M. Hertz, in which the conception of ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (Critique²) is presented for the first time (here it is called ‘The Limits of Sensibility and Reason’), Kant defines the main task of transcendental philosophy (or Kant’s transcendentalism) as a solution the following semantic problem of conformity:

«As I thought through the theoretical part, <…> I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I <…> had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics³, hitherto still hidden from itself. I asked myself this question: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call "representation" (germ. in uns Vorstellung) to the object** (germ. Gegenstand⁴)?» (AA, 10, p.129–130).

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² All references to the Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (abbreviated as *Critique*) are to the standard A/B pagination of the 1st (A–edition; 1781) and 2nd (B–edition; 1787) edns and cite the translation of *Critique of Pure Reason* (eds. P. Guyer and A. Wood), 1998 in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (CEWK). All translations of other Kant’s published writings (in English) are taken from the CEWK. References to other Kant’s works are to the volume and page of Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.) [so-called Akademie edition], 1902–, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols., Berlin; Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter) (AA).

³ Kant understands the metaphysics as an epistemology, not as an ontology: “metaphysics [in this narrower sense] is the science of the first principles of human cognition” [B871; 873] (cf. «Metaphisic a est scientia prima cognitionis humanue principia continens» [A.G. Baumgarten (1714–1762), Metaphisica. Ed.II. 1743, §1]).

⁴ Note that in English there is only one term ‘object’, with the help of which it is impossible to express the difference between ‘Gegenstand’ (rus. ’предмет’) and ‘Objekt’ (rus. ’объект’) of German language. If an object (Objekt) is an epistemological something that opposes the subject in one way or another (distinction "object vs. subject"), an object** (Gegenstand) is a semantic something, the object** (Gegenstand) of representation as sign (see [A108–9] (distinction "object** (Gegenstand) vs. representation (Vorstellung)") .At the same time (in addition), in English there is no exact analogue of the adjective ‘gegenständlich’ (rus. ’предметный’). Further I will convey the meaning of the adjective ‘gegenständlich’ with the help of the term ‘objectual’, distinguishing it from the adjective ‘objective’ (‘objectual representation’ as ‘the representation, insofar as it represents the object’).
A little below Kant outlines two possible ways of solving this problem of conformity/correspondence (resp. two types of intellects), connected with the fact that either objects predetermine our human representations (vector “from object/object** to representation”; intellectus ectypi), or representations predetermine existing objects (vector “from representation to object/object**”), which is typical for the divine intellect (intellectus archetypi), creating things, — and notices that both these approaches are not applicable to human understanding, which occupies as if were an intermediate position and contains in its composition the representations that do not arise from experience: a priori forms of sensuality and understanding.

2. Kant gives his solution of the problem of conformity already in Critique, where he connects it with the “Copernican revolution (turn)” as “the altered modus of thinking [in metaphysics]” [BXVIII]. The term “revolution/turn” indicates that Kant rejects the first — empirical — way to solve the problem of conformity (vector “from object/object** to representation”). At the same time, Kant’s “revolution” does not mean a simple reversal of the vector in the opposite to empiricism direction. The conceptual change of the problem in the formulation of the dyad “object — representation” to the triad «thing–in–itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung)», at the basis of which the most important for the transcendental idealism of Kant distinction between the things–in–themselves and appearances lies and without which it is impossible “to enter the Kant’s system [of transcendental philosophy]” (F. Jacobi) is its essential presupposition. Accordingly, the Kantian solution states that not things–in–themselves, but appearance as empirical objects (vector “from representation to object/object**”) are subordinated to our a priori representations, although in the structure of the “Copernican revolution” Kant

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5 In the original, Jacobi talks about the thing–in–itself, which afficire our sensuality: ‘without this presupposition [of the "thing in itself."] I was unable to enter into system, but with it I was unable to stay within it’. (Jacobi 1787, p.304), but the concept of thing–in–itself can not be introduced without postulating the concept of appearance (within the framework of difference «thing–in–itself — appearance»).
retains the empirical vector “from object/object∗∗ to representation”, by postulating the affecting of our sensibility with things–in–themselves.

3. Within the framework of the triad «thing–in–itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung)», appearance takes the middle position between object (thing) and representation, but the ontological and epistemic status of appearance in Kant’s view remains uncertain and needs further clarification. At the present time, two alternatives can be distinguished in the interpretation of the appearance: the early [traditional] theory of “two objects/worlds” and a later theory of “two aspects”. The first identifies appearance and representation (shifting appearance to the right and “gluing” it to representation), thereby opposing the objective world of things and the subjective world of mental representations and bringing Kant’s transcendentalism closer to Berkeley’s phenomenalism. The second — the theory of “two aspects” (in the broadest sense) — considers appearance as a certain aspect, or a modus of considering thing–in–itself, thereby postulating, on the one hand, the close [epistemic and ontological] connection between the Kantian appearance and thing–in–itself, and on the other hand, there is an ontological gap between the Kantian representation and appearance. The theory of “two aspects” involves a realistic interpretation of transcendental philosophy [as the theory of experience]: appearance represents by itself and in itself the real thing, transcendent to our consciousness [see ‘theory of appearing’ below].

6 My analysis of the structure of the “Copernican revolution” see in my paper (Katrechko 2016).
7 This interpretation has been presented in the first review of the Critique — the so-called Göttingen review by Ch. Garve (1742–1798) and J.G. Feder (1740–1821) and so on. Contemporary ‘weak’ versions of phenomenalism are considered in SEP—article (Stang 2016).
8 The ‘two–aspects’ theory/interpretation (or ‘double aspect’) was developed primarily in the works (Allison 1983, 2004), which largely relied on linguistic analysis (Prauss 1974). However, before that the ‘two–aspects’ theory were mentioned, for example, by H. Prichard (1909), H. Heimsoeth (1922), M. Heidegger (1927), H. Paton (1936), T. Weldon (1950), etc (Herring 1953, p.65) or in (Bird 1962, 2006). About the opposition of the ‘two–objects/world’ and ‘two–aspects’ reading (theory) see (Rohlf 2010). The textual support of ‘two–aspects’ theory are passages: BXVIII–XIX, A38–39/B55–56, A42/B59, A247/B303, A490–491/B518–519, — as well as Kant’s remarks from Opus Postumum [OP (Convolut X), AA 22:31; 22:33, 34; 22:43, 44; 22:414, 415 and others.
9 About it see my papers (Katrechko 2014a, 2014b, 2017, 2018).
10 The realistic interpretations of Kant’s transcendentalism presented in such books as (Horstmann 1997), (Collins 1999), (Abela 2002), (Westphal 2004), (Allais 2105) and others.
The correct interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy should keep the double difference of *appearance* both from *thing–in–itself* and *representation*\(^{11}\). On the one hand, Kant distinguishes *appearance* [as *thing–for–us*] from *thing-in-itself*, criticizing the previous “dogmatic” metaphysics for its naive realism, which does not conduct this transcendental distinction. On the other hand, the distinction between the “objectified” *appearance* and “mental” *representation* is also the fundamental one, as it is pointless [or ‘absurd proposition’] «that there is an appearance [in itself, i.e. as only *representation*] without anything that appears [i.e. *thing–in–itself*]» ([BXXVI–VII]; my addition in […]. — K.S.)\(^{12}\), and therefore, the radical separation of *appearance* from *thing–in–itself* and its “gluing” with *representation* that it is proposed in the *phenomenalistic* [a la G. Berkeley] *reading* of Kant in the framework of the “two worlds” theory is ill–posed too\(^{13}\).

4. At the same time, a supporter of the theory of “two aspects” should take into account that in a number of passages of *Critique* Kant textually identifies *appearance* and *representation*, what seems to confirm the theory of ‘two–objects’ and to be a serious counterargument to theory of “two aspects”. One of the possible lines of defense the theory of “two aspects” is in the careful analysis of these fragments and their (re–)interpretation, which does not lead to the complete identification (equation) of appearances and representations. H. Allison chooses a similar strategy. For example, in his analyzing of [A491/B519]:

“We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that every thing intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings

\(^{11}\) This is indicated, for example, by H. Robinson (Robinson 1994). K. Ameriks also talks of the need to preserve the Kantian double difference. In his work, in which he develops a *moderate interpretation* of Kant’s transcendentalism, he writes: “in introducing the unusual term ‘transcendently ideal’ for appearances, Kant means to, and can, give them a distinctively real but in-between status, that is, the status of a level of reality that is higher than what is ‘empirically ideal’ (that is, merely subjective in an individual, psychological, and occurrent sense) but is lower than the ‘transcendently real’ features of things in themselves” (Ameriks 2012, p.75–6).

\(^{12}\) This and other fragments of *Critique*, *Prolegomena*, and *Opus Postumum* (see the footnote 8 above) testify that Kant develops not the *theory of appearance*, but the *theory of appea*ring (see below paragraph 5 for further details).

or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. [This doctrine I call *transcendental idealism*].”

Allison remarks that although in the main sentence appearance and representation are equated, but in the subordinate clause Kant says that appearances represent objects, i.e. that the function of the appearance is to *represent* [existing] objects (the semantic relation of the reference, the theory of appearing), so that the appearances are identical with the representations only *functionally*, but not *substantively* \(^\text{14}\). In this case, a similar strategy interpreting the appearances can be extended to other “identifying” fragments (Allison 1983, 26f).

5. Following H. Allison, we will show that Kantian passages like “appearances, i.e. representation in us” do not necessary indicate the subjective status of the *appearance* and leave the possibility of its *objective* (non–phenomenalist) interpretation. Preceding our argument, we will outline the *basic argument*, which serves as the background premise (presupposition) for our defense strategy.

Any interpretation of this Kantian concept must take into account that under [transcendental] *appearances* Kant understood not some mental entities (phenomena), but what was earlier empirically understood as real things or *bodies* (if we take into account the spatial modus of their existence). They acquire marking as *appearances* [of things] only in the course of the transcendental analysis of our “modus of cognition” [B25], which does not cancel their real status from the empirical (conventional) point of view. In ‘*General remarks on the transcendental aesthetic*’ Kant writes:

If I say: in space and time intuition represents both outer objects as well as the self–intuition of the mind as each affects our senses, i.e., as it *appears*, that is not to say that these objects would be a mere *illusion* \(^\text{15}\). For in the appearance the objects indeed even properties that we attribute to them, are always regarded as something really given, only

\(^{14}\) A functional approach (reading) to the interpretation of Kant’s transcendentalism was proposed to Cassirer: see his book «Substance and Function» (1910). The essence of it can be expressed by Cassirer’s thesis: “*We cognize not [physical] objects/thing in the world [substantive modus], but we cognize the world objective-ly [*‘thing-ly’*; functional modus].*” (Cassirer 1937). Let us note that such functional reading is associated with the rotation from ‘adjectival/thing’ to ‘adverbial’ language, or adverbial interpretation (Baldner 1990): *appearances* ‘is not the objects of experience, but rather the experience of objects’ (Baldner 1990, p.9). The adverbial interpretation of Kant based on the *adverbial theory of perception* (Chisholm 1957).

\(^{15}\) Note that Kant terminologically distinguishes the *appearance* [Erscheinung] and *illusion* [Schein]. See also Refl. 5400 (AA 18, p.172).
insofar as this property depends only on the kind of intuition of the subject in the relation of the given object to it then this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself (germ. ‘Objekt an sich’16)… It would be my own fault if I made that which I should count as appearance into mere illusion. [B69–70] *

Below, in the footnote Kant declares even the objective nature of appearance’s predicates:

*«the predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object in itself, in relation to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose…» ([B69–70fn]; my italic — K.S). And it is no coincidence that Kant’s transcendental idealism is compatible with empirical realism [A370; 371].

Thus (from this point of view) the transcendental idealism of Kant appears to be, rather not as a theory–appearance, but as a theory–appearing17. Let us explain this with an example. So, if we take a photograph of a person (as a representation), then according to the appearance–theory, the photograph itself is the object of our cognition here, and according to the appearing–theory, the [appearing] here person (i.e. an appearance of this person) is the object of cognition (example of R. Howell18).

6. We now turn to the presentation of our argument in support of the objectivity of appearances. Let us begin with the Kantian definition of transcendental idealism (TI). In the ‘Criticism of Fourth Paralogism’ of 1st ed. of Critique Kant understands TI as “the doctrine that [appearances] are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.” ([A369]; cf. [A491/B519] above).

If we model this definition on the “object — representation” scale, it is obvious that Kant shifts the boundary between object and representation to the right, narrowing the “objective/real” area of objects and expanding the “subjective” domain of representations. The actual “space” and “time”, which used to belong to the realm of the objective (objects

16 Germ.: «dieser Gegenstand als Erscheinung von ihm selber als Objekt an sich unterschieden wird».
17 For the first time, the distinction between appearance theory and appearing theory was made by (Prichard 1909, p.74); see also (Barker 1967). Appearing–theory (in general form) was developed in the works of W. Sellars and (especially) R. Chisholm (Chisholm 1950, 1957).
18 Compare: “I apperceive my representation in thought; but the object** [Gegenstand] of my thought is the object** presented by the representation, not the representation itself.” (Howell 2011).
and their properties), are now derived from it and form a new intermediate area, which can be called the domain of representations–2. Moreover, it is this middle [spatial–temporal] domain of representations–2 that can be correlated with the domain of “external” appearances that are of interest to us here and which were correlated by the pre–Kantian thought with real objects or things–in–themselves. Kant writes about this just below, continuing his reflections on the nature of TI in [A370–80]. In this case, the TI–domain of representations expands and unites domains of representations–1 and representations–2. The first (former) of them can be called subjective [empirical] representations, or mental representations (such as the image of an object in our mind), and the second (suggested by Kant) — objective–objectual (germ. ‘gegenständlich’) [transcendental] representations (as ‘the representation, insofar as it represents the object’)20; germ. “gegenständliche Vorstellung”)21, which before Kant were related to domain of objectively [really] existing objects and which Kant displaces into the domain of spatial–temporal representations.

Thus, the appearances in this model (on the “object — representation” scale) have an objective–objectual status, since they refer not to subjective representations (empirical representation–1) — representations, but to objective ['gegenständlich”] representations (transcendental representations–2) — presentations. Schematically, the above can be represented as follows:

![Diagram of representation domains]

Below we give additional arguments (explanations) to back up the thesis on the objectivity of appearances.

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19 In the field of representations (as genus), more types can be distinguished, but here we confine ourselves to these two.

20 The expression ‘objective – objectual representation’ (as ‘the representation, insofar as it represents the object’; German “gegenständliche Vorstellung”, or Russian «объективно–объектное представление») is the [logical] kind of [logical] genus of [expression] ‘objective representation’.

21 Kant speaks of the objective nature of the “cognitive” representations (of interest to us here) in his classification of representations: “The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the objective perception a is a cognition (cognitio)” (B376); my italic my. — K.S.). In Critique he characterizes them as representations that have “objective validity” [BXXVI, B298 and so on]. B. Bolzano introduces “objective representation” as the technical term in (Bolzano 1972), but here we use this expression in a la Kantian sense.

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7. For a correct understanding of Kant’s concept (including the Kantian concept of “appearance”), one should keep in mind that in the Kant’s Critique there are two types of discourse (resp. two perspectives): empirical and transcendental ones\textsuperscript{22}, which Kant usually does not specifically fix in the text\textsuperscript{23}. The identified by us two domains of representation can be correlated with representations in the empirical and transcendental senses [resp. empirical and transcendental representations]. Accordingly, the Kantian equation of appearances and representations can not be interpreted as the equation of appearances and representations in the empirical sense, i.e. to equate appearances with mental representations, as it happens in the theory of two objects. For Kant appearance is an appearance of a transcendental object, i.e. an appearance in the transcendental perspective, or transcendental appearance (as presentation)\textsuperscript{24}, which, from the empirical point of view, corresponds not to the mental essence, but real things in the spatial-temporal modus, i.e. empirical objects [of experience].

8. As we noted above, when discussing the specifics of TI in the ‘Criticism of Fourth Paralogism’, Kant gives a transcendental analysis [of the use] of the preposition “outside us” [A373]. At the same time, Kant completely uncritically uses the dual expression “in (within) us” (Germ. “in uns” [A373]). Let’s conduct a transcendental (a la Kant) analysis of the expression “[appearance as representation] in us / in (our) mind”.

(8.1) Firstly, let us pay attention to the fact that the very expression “in mind”, if we take into account the spatial meaning of the preposition “in/within”, is metaphorical and vague enough and, therefore, inaccurate: [mental] representations are not present in our mind ‘as things in the box’ (Husserl).

(8.2) Secondly, if in traditional sense the expression “in mind” indicates a mental area, i.e. the domain of representations–1, Kant’s selection of the spatial–temporal domain of representations–2 presupposes the assignment of the “in” preposition to sensuality: “in

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\textsuperscript{22} More about the need to distinguish empirical and transcendental discourses (resp. perspectives) in Kant is told by G. Bird (Bird 1962, 2006) and H. Allison (Allison 1983, 2004). Note that we have already implicitly been guided by this distinction above, for example in paragraph 5, distinguishing the object/thing in transcendental and empirical senses.

\textsuperscript{23} It is interesting in this respect [A373], in which Kant identifies and analyzes the two possible — empirical and transcendental — meanings of the preposition “out of us” (for more details, see paragraph 8 a little bit later).

\textsuperscript{24} The expression the ‘transcendental appearance’ does not occur in Kant’s texts. S. Palmquist uses this expression (Palmquist 1986).
our sensuality” — that is not the same as being “in mind”, since sensuality is “physiological” and refers not to mind, but body.

(8.3) Moreover, as Kant notes in [A375; especially A375fn], the appearances are not “in mind” (as mental representations), but “in space” (as bodies) [although, of course, Kant’s space appears as a priori form of our sensuality].

(8.4). Finally, since the domain of representations is expanded by Kant through a priori [forms of] representation (space and time), this implies a transition from empirical (individual) “consciousness/mind” to [transcendental] “consciousness in general” [Prol, §20], which, in contrast to subjective individual consciousness, is more accurately to characterize as a domain of trans– or inter–subjective, or as a domain of quasi–objective. Let us note that this domain of inter–subjective can be correlated, as K. Popper does, with the field of human language/culture/knowledge and refer it to a special world, along with the (first) objective and (second) subjective world, the ‘third world’ [compare with Husserl’s intentional reality].

Thus transcendental analysis replaces the usual (empirical) distinction (dyad) of “outside – in” with the transcendental triad: “outside transcendental — {outside empirical = in transcendental} — in empirical”, empirical objects are the middle part of it; it correlates with the domain of [external] transcendental appearances. This (taking into account the distinction between empirical and transcendental discourse (see paragraph 7 above), including the empirical and transcendental meaning “out” and “in” (see paragraph 8), can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thing–it–itself</th>
<th>[outer] Appearance</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>«outside» (transcendental) VS. «outside» (empirical)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>«in» (transcendental) VS. «in» (empirical)</td>
<td>Mental image [of object]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 What does it mean «things [= empirically external objects] that are to be encountered in space» [A373], if “space” is understood not in the empirical sense (for example, as Newton’s absolute space) but in the transcendental sense? This issue requires further discussion.
9. The fact of the correlation of the Kantian appearance not with our understanding, but with human sensuality [a priori forms of space and time] noted in paragraph 8.3 allows us to offer one more argument-analogy to back up the reality/objectivity of [transcendental] appearance. In the cognitive process, sensuality as the “bodily” organs of perception of external information acts as an intermediary between objective and subjective. Not passively perceived through sensuality sensual intuitions, but its active processing/transformation by the understanding is subjective in the exact sense of the word. In some approximation, the human sense organs (resp. sensibility) can be regarded as physical tools [of perception], i.e. as input devices that “deliver” [empirical] things to us [as appearance, or thing–for–us].

The Frege’s metaphor of a telescope conveys the specific of transcendental ontology of appearance well. Suppose that we observe a star by means of a telescope; the star itself will have an objective (real) status, which corresponds to the Kantian thing–in–itself. Its (star’s) mental image in our consciousness will already be subjective, it can be correlated with [mental] representation. Let us ask the question: what ontological status will the star have on the lens of the telescope (that can correlate with the Kantian appearance), which is basically as if between the objective (real) star itself and its subjective (mental) image of our consciousness? It is clear that [image of] star on the lens of the telescope (= the presentation of star) is neither real (objective) star–in–itself (thing–in–itself), nor mental (subjective) image [of our consciousness], i.e. Kantian "representation in us." My answer will be that this telescope–appearance (telescope ‘image’ of star) will have a specific intermediate ontological — transcendental — status, an [quasi–] objective status of presentation, although it differs from the objective status of a real star–in–itself.

Of course, comparison of the human eye with a physical device is only an analogy, and our “living” sense organs are not physical devices and differ from them in some important respects, — but this analogy allows us to understand the thesis that the Kantian appearances [of sensuality] act as objective–objectual representations (more precisely, as objective–objectual presentations). Let us note in this connection that in his “Anthropology” Kant ranks senses according to the degree of objectivity, emphasizing

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26 L. Falkenstein says in his works about corporality and physiology of the senses (sensation). In doing so, he compares our senses organs with the input devices (Falkenstein 1991, 1995).

27 Compare with Husserl’s intentional reality or Popper’s third world.
among them — as the most objective ones — the spatial–temporal senses of sight (vision) and hearing (Kant 2007, p.154–6; §§15–19)), what also speaks about the objectivity of appearances.

10. In the end of our analysis of the ontological and epistemic status (or ‘nature’) of the Kantian appearance, we briefly denote another argument in support of the thesis on the need to distinguish appearances and representations, which in a certain sense continues the defense line of H. Allison (see paragraph 4 above). In his arguments, Kant, as a rule, does not clearly distinguish representation and object** of representation, although an appearance acts as “an indefinite object** of empirical intuition (contemplation)” (B34))28.

In this case, we view representation as a sign that has content (matter) and form29, or meaning and sense30. Each representation represents something [object** in general, =x], i.e. is the object** [Gegenstand] of representation. And even if representation is subjective, and Kant’s [transcendental] representations are such, since [a priori] forms of sensibility are subjective, then the object** of representation is a real–objective one. Let us explain this with the example of the image of a “table”. The mental image of the table is [its] representation, but we call this representation, in order to distinguish it from other representations, using the name of the object** of representation — the “table”. The equation of representation and its object** is the result of an implicit (quasi–)metonymic transfer, when the whole is called by the name of its part, which Kant does when he calls the representation by the name of its object** and thereby equally identifies appearance and representation31. This distinction makes it possible to clarify the meaning of the Kantian identification of representations and appearances: each appearance in its form is a

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28 Please pay attention to reasoning on objects–in–general from [A108–9]. Here Kant captures the distinction between representation and its object** and talks about the appearance as the object** [of presentation] ([A108]; compare with [B34]). And here he says that the appearances (as representations), in turn, also have their object**, the non-empirical transcendental object** “= X” is such [A109].

29 See Port–Royal Logic. Compare with Kant’s distinction of matter and form [of appearance] in [B34].

30 See contemporary logical semantics of G. Frege or/and E. Husserl.

31 Given imposed distinction between representation and object** of representation, we can also speak of “mere representation” (representation–I: [als] bloße Vorstellung) and “representation of something (things)”, i.e. representation in the genitive sense (representation–II, or presentation). Then Kant’s appearances can be equated to presentations, but not to representations. In this connection let us note [B164], in which Kant says, first, that “appearances are only representations of things”, i.e. presentation, and then that “as mere representations [representation–I] they stand under no law of connection at all [by means of our understanding, which links — K.S.]”, thereby mixing here two meanings of the term ‘representation’ as representation (representation–I) and presentation (representation–II).
“subjective” representation [in us], but as an object** (content; germ. ‘Gegenstand’) of representation is objectively–objectual one; as it represents by itself and in itself the appearance of an object**/Gegenstand [see the ‘theory of appearing’ above].

Conclusion

Kant’s appearance is the third full essence in the composition of the transcendental triad «thing–in–itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung)». Without appearance, i.e. without distinction “thing–in–itself vs. appearance”, it is impossible to imagine the transcendental philosophy of Kant. In this case, the identification of appearance and representation as it is proposed in the theory of ‘two objects’ (or phenomenal interpretation), i.e. the reverse reduction of the transcendental triad to the dyad. The Kantian ‘appearance’ is the appearance of an object (thing–in–itself), which assumes, albeit in explicit form, the semantic relation of reference: appearance (as a sign, or ‘a designation of an object’ [B235]) is inconceivable without what is in it (the sign’s meaning/referent). Thus, the Kantian appearance as an empirical object (transcendental (re)presentations–2) acts as the most important constituent of experimental (cognition) knowledge, it has objective validity (objectivity) and differs from our subjective [mental] representations as “ideas” of our mind (empirical representations–1).

References


Kantian Appearance as an Objective–Objectual Representation


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Kantian Appearance as an Objective–Objectual Representation


