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Freedom and *Klugheit* in Kant's *Anthropology Lectures*

Libertad y Klugheit en las Lecciones de Antropología de Kant

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Abstract

Kant holds in his works on morality that prudence is not free, because only action under the moral law is free. He also holds that acting on prudent reasons is incompatible with the moral law. If one explores his lectures on anthropology, however, one has reason to believe that not only is prudent action free in some sense as freedom of choice, but it is also not incompatible with moral action, since it does not necessitate using other human beings as mere means, even though it is about using other human beings as ends to one's happiness. This article will show how Kant holds these positions in his lectures on anthropology.

Keywords

Kant, Anthropology, Freedom, Klugheit

Not much is said about Kant's *Anthropology* and its accompanying lectures as a *Klugheitslehre*, but Kant intended it to be a *Klugheitslehre* and not merely empirical psychology although he does on occasion call it empirical psychology (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:243).¹ Two questions arise then for the coherence of his anthropology lectures and his moral philosophy and one is: how can being prudent be compatible with being moral? The second question is whether Kant believes that one is free when one is being prudent. Scholars dealing with Kant's moral philosophy conclude on the basis of his *Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals* that moral action is not prudent action and that the two are incompatible with each other such that if one is being prudent one is not being moral. Further, they agree that morality is truly free action and that prudent action is relegated to sensibility and is, hence, not free. However, these are not the positions that Kant takes in

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¹ Translated by Allen W. Wood in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

his lectures on anthropology. In fact, prudent action is compatible with moral action though not the same as moral action, and actions oriented by prudence can be considered free, even though Kant calls it the free power of choice. In this essay, I will clarify this position with reference to Kant's lectures on anthropology.

***Klugheit* as Free?**

Reinhard Brandt, in his article "Klugheit bei Kant," comes to the conclusion that prudent action cannot be explained theoretically as free action. He writes:

The actions of prudence are positioned just before these alternatives: they must be reckoned to the area of morality or nature. In the first case, every outer action and every judgment stands under the definitive control of the categorical imperative, in the second case, it is relegated to the mere appearance of nature, ... If this interpretation is correct, then Kant's doctrine of prudence ends in an *aporia*, which perhaps in its theoretical realm no longer allows it to be resolved (Brandt, 131).

In other words, prudent action must be relegated to nature, sensibility, and animality, while morality is truly free. Prudence, then, cannot be free. But this is a confusing situation, since prudence is determined by reason and should be considered free. Yet, Kant says in the *Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals*: "hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same" (GMS, AA 4:447).² Kant uses the word "*Wille*" here and we would have to conclude from this passage that only the "*Wille*" is free. Prudence, which is not based on the "*Wille*," is not free. Prudence, though not having determinate understanding of its end of happiness, does, nevertheless, will the means to its end. This has to be a role of reason and not nature, for the means have to be chosen. Kant does have a solution to this problem, at least in his early lectures on anthropology. But, first, let me establish what the purpose of the anthropology lecture is, in order to frame the solution.

Anthropology as a *Klugheitslehre*

I have argued that Kant's *Anthropology* is a *Klugheitslehre* (Wilson, 2016). With the Friedlander lecture (1775-76), Kant asserts that anthropology is not only pragmatic, but that it is also about prudence. He says: "Therefore, human beings are not studied in speculative terms, but pragmatic, in the application of the knowledge according to the rules of prudence, and this is anthropology" (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:470).³ This establishes that the purpose of the anthropology lectures is pragmatic and hence is to teach prudence. Kant goes on to assert: "For all pragmatic doctrines are doctrines of prudence, where for all our skills, we also have the means to make proper use of everything. For we study the human

² Translated by Mary Gregor in *Practical Philosophy*.

³ Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

being in order to become more prudent...” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:471).⁴ Prudence is a skill that seeks out the means that pragmatic anthropology teaches, and by prudence, Kant means that the student will know the “proper use of everything” (Ibid). And if this is not clear enough, Kant maintains: “Everything that bears no relation to prudent conduct of human beings, does not belong to anthropology” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:472).⁵ In other words, pragmatic anthropology is about teaching the skill of prudence. This statement would exclude empirical psychology, moral philosophy, and any speculative understanding from the anthropology lectures. The Friedlander lecture is not alone in defining the anthropology lectures as determined by prudence.

The Pillau lectures describe the utility of anthropology as “how one should win over human beings” (V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25:734).⁶ Winning over human beings is something that characterizes prudence. So the purpose again of the anthropology lectures is to teach the skill of prudence. The Menschenkunde lecture characterizes the doctrine as knowledge of the world which is knowledge of human beings so we know how to apply our knowledge to them, because “we need the assistance of other human beings for the attainment of other things...” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:854).⁷ Prudence has to do with gaining the cooperation and assistance of other people. If ‘gaining the assistance’ of other human beings is not already clearly defined as prudence, Kant’s lecture notes goes on to assert: “A doctrine is pragmatic insofar as it makes us prudent and useful in public matters...” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:856).⁸ All of these passages come from different periods of Kant’s lectures, which spanned from 1772-1796, so one could conclude that Kant did, in fact, consistently intend his lectures to be a *Klugheitslehre*. Kant speaks often about prudence in these lectures on anthropology, and though Kant is clearly attempting to convey knowledge of human beings, it is intended that the students make use of the knowledge for the sake of prudence. The lectures propose to increase the skill in prudence in the students.

Kant continues his identification of pragmatic anthropology with prudence in the Mrongovius lectures: “Prudence is proficiency or knowledge in reaching one’s aim, and making use of this skill or using other human beings for one’s aims...Every pragmatic instruction makes one prudent” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1210).⁹ Thus, prudence is about using other human beings for one’s ends. He goes on to make it very clear that pragmatic knowledge is prudence: “Anthropology is called pragmatic if it serves prudence rather than erudition” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1211).¹⁰ Finally, even the Busolt lecture (1788-1789) identifies the anthropology as a *Klugheitslehre*. Kant asserts: “Anthropology teaches us this, by showing how we can use human beings to our end. The rules of prudence are

⁴ Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Translated by Allen W. Wood, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

⁷ Translated by Robert B. Loudon, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

¹⁰ Ibid.

taught not in the schools but in worldly cognition” (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1436).¹¹ We can conclude that, for Kant, his lectures on anthropology are knowledge of the world, which is knowledge of human beings for pragmatic purposes, which is equivalent to teaching his students the skill of prudence for the sake of using other human beings for one's own ends or influencing them.

Happiness as the End of Prudence

On the face of it, if prudence is using other human beings as a means to one's own ends, it would appear to be in stark contrast to the moral law, as Kant defines it in its humanity formulation: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS, AA 4:429).¹² Prudence is exactly using other human beings as means to one's own end. And that end is happiness. The question could be raised, however, if by prudence Kant means using others as a mere means or whether prudence could be compatible with the moral law, because prudence is not using another simply as a means, but also is treating the other as an end-in-themselves at the same time.

Repeatedly, beginning with the Collins lecture, Kant associates prudence with the end of happiness and he defines happiness in a specific way. In the Collins lecture he says: “Since prudence is a capacity, to reach happiness through the satisfaction of the sum of all inclinations...” (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:211).¹³ The Parow lecture, also defines happiness as the satisfaction of sum of all inclinations (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:371). In the Parow lecture, Kant asserts that prudence is the means to happiness: “The capacity to choose the best means to happiness is prudence. Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all inclinations...” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:413). In the Pillau lecture, prudence is defined as the skill in the choice of the best means and is about satisfying one's inclination (V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25:779). For the *Menschenkunde* lecture, happiness is also defined as the “complete satisfaction of all of our inclinations” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1081). The reason why it is necessary to know human beings and be able to use them to achieve happiness is because “it is always human beings who impede our ability to satisfy our inclinations” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1143). For the *Mrongovius* lecture, it is affect that makes us imprudent and hence incapable of comparing one sensation with the “sum of all sensations” (V-Anth/Mron AA 25:1340; 25:1342; ¹⁴ V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1115). Prudence then is the skill in using other human beings as a means to the end of happiness, which is the satisfaction of the sum of all inclinations and not just one inclination.

It is important to know what the end of prudence is to understand the means to that end. The means to that end of happiness is using other people. In a passage from the *Mrongovius* lecture, Kant maintains: “when a person has himself in his power he is

¹¹ Translated by Allen W. Wood, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

¹² Translation by Mary Gregor, *Practical Philosophy*.

¹³ Translation is mine unless otherwise noted.

¹⁴ Translation by Robert R. Clewis, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

happier” and then goes on to say that “unhappiness comes about because they cannot abstract according to their power of choice” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1240).¹⁵ Here a person’s happiness depends upon one’s power of choice. If prudence has happiness as its end, then it needs the power of choice to realize its ends. Later, we will speak about the power of choice. Here, however, the ability to abstract or look away from a wart on someone’s nose, or ignore someone’s annoying habits, is important to happiness, and is not a self-centered goal or aim, but rather a noble one that allows one to look at what is more important in a person, rather than the surface of a person.

In any case, we can conclude that just because happiness is the end of prudence, it does not mean that it is necessarily self-centered and selfish, and hence against the moral law. It can also refer to helping others fulfill their inclinations.

Using Other People

If the end of prudence is happiness, then the means of prudence is using other people as one’s own end. But, does this necessarily mean using people as a mere means? Kant defines prudence as ‘using others as one’s own end’ repeatedly throughout the lectures (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:855; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1212; V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1436). However, this means-end way of speaking about prudence is not the only way Kant portrays prudence. Kant also speaks of the usefulness of anthropology that “it teaches how one should win over human beings” (V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25:734).¹⁶ Presumably one could not win over another human being without treating her as an end-in-herself or by gaining her cooperation by appealing to her inclinations or reason. In this case, one would not be using another human being as a means only, since she is cooperating freely, because she has been won over. In the *Menschenkunde*, Kant puts it a little differently; there he speaks about the fact that “we need the assistance of other human beings for the attainment of other things” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:854).¹⁷ The human being could, of course, gain the assistance of other human beings by using them as a mere means, but it is not ruled out that she gains the assistance of others by appealing to their reason or inclinations and wants. Kant goes on to talk about how “practical knowledge of the human being makes us prudent; it is knowledge of the art of how one human being has influence on another and can lead him according to his purposes” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:855).¹⁸ Here it is the purpose of prudence to “influence” other people and thereby “lead” them. Thus using another person as a means can be interpreted as influencing them and gaining their cooperation. Again, one could influence other people by appealing to their affects and passions, but one could also influence others by appealing to their sense of honor or their reason. Having an influence on others in order to use them as a means to

¹⁵ Translation by Holly L. Wilson. Clewis translates “nach Willkuer” as “at will.”

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Translated by Robert B. Louden, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

¹⁸ Ibid.

one's own ends could very well be a way of appealing to another person's ends and, hence, treating them in a way that they approve being treated or they consent to being treated.

Kant speaks also of having an influence on the opinion of the other (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1146-47). Presumably if one appeals to the opinion of the other person, one is also appealing to the other person's reason. One treats another as an end by appealing to her reason. Patrick Kain shows in detail how prudence is related to rationality. The Mrongovius lecture notes also associate having an influence on another with gaining power over others and with achieving one's ends (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1355-56). Again, Kant could be talking about gaining power over someone's passions and affects or he could be talking about gaining power by influencing others to cooperate in one's ends. It is not inconceivable that Kant intends to characterize prudence as the skill that allows one to influence other people in a way that gains their freely given cooperation in fulfilling one's ends. In other words, the other person sees the ends as something worth their cooperation and not something that degrades them or treats them as mere means.

There is some evidence that Kant believes it is imprudent to have an influence over people who have passions and affects. "Affect," Kant says, "opposes not only ethics [Sittlichkeit] but also prudence" (V-Anth/Parow AA 25:412). One could appeal to another's affects and it would be immoral, but Kant also insists that it would be imprudent. One probably does not succeed in achieving one's ends when one appeals to affect or if one is in the throes of affect. In the Friedlander lecture notes, Kant clarifies that "therefore it is the rule of wisdom and prudence not to tolerate passions in the mind, but courageously to preserve the mind, because they make [the mind] unable to carry out deliberations, and to achieve purpose in accordance with the prescription of reason" (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:621).¹⁹ Prudence, then, permits deliberations, unless it is overwhelmed by passions. Still, Kant goes on to say: "However, we can thereby promote reason's efficaciousness and combine the passions with reason, but not let them dominate" (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:621).²⁰ Thus, one could conceivably have a passion, but still not let it dominate, and have the capacity to deliberate and exercise one's prudence. This would be the case not only for the person who is attempting to achieve his ends, but also for the person who is the means to the other's ends. If one has a passion, another may appeal to that passion for honor, for instance, without overriding the other person's reason, if that passion is not dominating their reason.

On the other hand, prudence is not so self-centered that it is concerned with using other people without their consent, according to the Mrongovius lecture notes. There, Kant maintains that prudence is using other people, but has in mind what interests everyone as well: "But prudence is a proficiency or knowledge in reaching one's aim, and making use of this skill or using other human beings for one's aims; but to do this I must avail myself of what everyone understands and interests everyone" (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1210).²¹ This is one indication we have from Kant that prudence is not meant to be simply selfish

¹⁹ Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

and self-centered, but must take everyone's concerns into consideration. Finally, Kant distinguishes prudence from cunning, which he says it resembles only superficially, and which attracts only limited men.²² Cunning is the skill "in cheating others."²³ Presumably, cunning would use other human beings as mere means because of its tendency to deceive and dissemble. Prudence would not do this because it doesn't lead to one's long-term happiness.

***Klugheit* as Free Action**

As mentioned above, some of Kant's writings lead one to believe that there is no free will except the will that is subordinated to the categorical imperative and, hence, prudent action would not be considered free and must be relegated to nature and sensibility. In the last lecture on anthropology we have, the Busolt lecture, Kant seems to hold this position as he asserts: "One can consider the human being as a natural and as a free being. As a natural being one considers him according to the predispositions [*Anlagen*] encountered in him, and that is the character of the human being as an animal. With this consideration we have made a beginning. The character of a human being as a free being is posited in his will [*Wille*]" (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1530). One of the predispositions encountered in the human being is the pragmatic predisposition, which has prudence as the skill it develops (Anth, AA 7:323; Päd, AA 9:450). Thus, this would seem to make prudence again relegated to nature and human animality. Yet, this is also inconsistent with Kant's position elsewhere in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, where Kant argues that the predisposition to animality is different from the predisposition to humanity and the moral predisposition, precisely because they use reason (RGV, AA 6:26). It could be that in this passage from the Busolt lecture Kant is not intending to use predisposition in the strict philosophical sense he uses it in the *Anthropology* and in the *Religion*. It would be then only a tendency. If that were so, Kant could still consistently hold that the pragmatic predisposition is guided by reason and is, hence, "free" in some sense. What that sense is remains to be seen.

To be consistent with the *Groundwork* and with the Busolt passage above, Kant cannot mean that prudence is an expression of the *Wille* or the human will. Yet, clearly prudence, which is guided by reason, must be free in some sense. The earliest lecture we have, the Collins lecture, gives Kant a way to characterize prudence as "free" without asserting that it is the same as the "*Wille*." In the Collins lecture, and sometimes touched upon in the following lecture notes, Kant uses "power of choice" or *Willkür* to characterize prudent action. He also makes it clear that he considers *Willkür* to be free action. Kant maintains in the Collins lecture: "The greatest happiness in the world consists in the power of choice, which consists of all remaining acts of exercising and restraining" (V-

²² I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, AA 7: 172, 198.

²³ *Ibid*, 7:205.

Anth/Collins, AA 25:29). The power of choice, or *Willkür*, is free to do things and to refrain from things. I follow Meerbote in translating *Willkür* as “power of choice” (1982). The power of choice does even more: “A free power of choice to determine one’s condition oneself, and awaken self-activated ideas in oneself. This belongs to the higher faculty of the soul” (V-Anth/Collins, 25:29, 30). The power of choice has the power of self-determination and of producing new ideas in oneself. And this power belongs to the higher faculty of the soul, not to the lower faculty, which belongs to animality and sensibility. Every human being has a free power of choice or volition (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:21). One can also not abandon this power of choice (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:30). Like the *Wille*, which Kant contrasts to inclination, Kant, here in this lecture, contrasts the power of choice with inclination (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:30).

This 1772 lecture seems to almost equate the power of choice with what Kant will later call the *Wille*, the will. However, Kant doesn’t just contrast the power of choice with inclinations, but also with involuntary actions. He asserts: “When one is even driven to involuntary action, Thus, our worth is reduced more than if one merely does not have one’s sensations in one’s power” (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:69). Like the *Wille*, which has unconditional worth, the power of choice also gives the human being worth. But the power of choice goes beyond the *Wille*, since it does more than the *Wille*. It also is behind the combination of our ideas (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:75). Attention and abstraction are also acts of the power of choice (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:37-38). This is meaningful, because these are not acts that Kant will apply to *Wille*, even though in the later lectures he will not speak of the power of choice, but rather of voluntary and involuntary actions.

The Parow lecture (1772-73) also raises the power of choice as a higher power in contrast to the lower power of animality. The higher faculty consists of humanity (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:256). The higher faculty of choice is contrasted with the conditions of sensations (ibid). In fact, by means of the power of choice one directs one’s sensual sensations the way one wants (ibid). Otherwise, sensation impedes the power of choice (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:259). Significantly, the power of choice is the about self-control as well: “One says the human being is himself not powerful, when his inner condition, or himself is not subordinated to the power of choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:292). The power of choice is about being in control of one’s self and one’s inclinations and sensations. On the other hand, involuntary action is a passion (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:293).

Kant asserts that the power of choice is a power and is free: “We have this capacity and this is at the same time only a tool. We have, however, also a power which sets this capacity in reality and that is the free power of choice. We can be moved by the lower power, which is physical necessity and animality, or through the free power of choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:301). Here the power of choice is clearly not associated with animality or the lower power. Kant will also say something similar of the *Wille* in his critical works.

Kant uses the word *willkürlich* to speak of faculties that are voluntary and he will also speak of faculties that are involuntary, like fantasy (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:314). Fantasy can stand under the power of choice and is a matter of prudence (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:314-15). In this passage, Kant associates the power of choice with prudence. But

remember, the whole anthropology is about prudence, so any talk of the power of choice must also be about prudence. The power of choice is free, but it also presupposes a capability: “freedom is still only a negative condition under which a human being can satisfy his inclination. The capability must still come to this freedom” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:417). It is prudence, which aims to fulfill the inclinations. Kant goes on to say: “The capability is the power through which one can bring into being something which is consistent with our power of choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:418). Thus, something more is needed in order for the power of choice to achieve its goals. What this is, Kant does not name, but it is not long after this that Kant speaks of character, which prescribes the laws of the will [*Wille*] (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:438).

The Friedlander lecture (1775-1776) continues to speak of the power of choice, and it is useful for abstracting from and attending to events or persons: “If however, I have the power of mind under the power of choice and can attend and abstract when I want, then I dismiss it from my mind” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:489).²⁴ Obviously more is meant by power of choice than the will [*Wille*], because it pertains to the ability to turn our attention from one thing to another or to deny perception of things. Prudence benefits from this, since we are much less likely to be caught in the throes of an affect, if we can turn away from an object that elicits an affect. The freedom of which Kant speaks in the Friedlander lecture is that which allows one to fulfill one’s inclinations, rather than to subordinate one’s inclinations to the moral law so the power of choice is obviously something different than the will (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:581). Yet even though the power of choice is concerned with fulfilling inclinations, it is still “free.” Kant asserts that: “Freedom is therefore a general object to satisfy the entirety of inclination” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:582).²⁵ And what is meaningful about this freedom is that it allows for us to impute responsibility to a person: “Everything good is also possible through freedom, for nothing can very well be imputed to one who is not free” (ibid).

Passion on the other hand, takes away one’s composure and self-control (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:589). Kant says: “Passion is indeed just that, which is not subject to our power of choice and reason” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:591).²⁶ Thus, passion and affects are not subject to our power of choice. And here Kant associates the power of choice with reason. This is another reason for identifying the power of choice as free. So, for Kant, during this period, the power of choice is not only free, but it is guided by reason. It is not that the power of choice cannot have power over passion, but that one who is in the throes of passion is not subject to the power of choice and reason. Rather, Kant speaks of having oneself in one’s power, “so that no impression takes him out of composure...” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:940). Thus, the power of choice is not about being subject to the moral law, but about self-control and the freedom to fulfill one’s inclinations. We would also have to conclude that the power of choice, if it is oriented toward happiness and is

²⁴ Translation by G. Felicitas Munzel, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

prudent action, would have to aim at the satisfaction of the sum total of all one's inclinations. Both the power of choice and prudence aim at satisfying inclinations. Hence, the power of choice is the kind of will that prudence makes use of. Prudence is not a factor of the *Wille*, but it is a factor of the power of choice (*Willkür*). Both the will and the power of choice are, hence, free.

The power of choice and prudence are impeded by affects and passions. Thus, their relationship is very tight. One can easily conclude that prudence is effective through the power of choice rather than through the will. This preserves Kant's connection between character, the moral law, and will, while at the same time giving an account of how prudent action is also free action, even if not moral action. Kant continues to speak of the power of choice in the *Menschenkunde* (1781-82) lectures. There he asserts: "The human being is at rest, when he has the state of his mind in his power of choice" (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1114-15). Not to have one's mind in one's power of choice is to be disturbed. Kant also speaks of the freedom to satisfy one's inclinations (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1142). Freedom is an inclination. One needs freedom in order to fulfill one's inclination to freedom. This has to be the power of choice, which is aimed at inclinations. As Kant maintains in the Busolt lecture: "By means of freedom the human being is in the condition so that he can satisfy unimpeded inclinations of all sorts" (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1520).

Kant does not talk about the power of choice much after his early lectures, but he does occasionally mention it and he speaks often of freedom to pursue inclinations and by this freedom he certainly doesn't mean moral freedom or freedom of the will, since it is precisely against inclinations that the moral law is effective. But Kant does have a way of talking about prudence and the kind of freedom appropriate to it with the concept of the power of choice. Thus, there really is no *aporia* regarding prudence and its freedom. Kant himself calls the power of choice free. The will is free in that it is capable of submitting itself to the moral law. One might protest that the talk of the free power of choice preceded Kant's critical turn, but we have plenty of references to freedom to pursue inclinations even after the critical turn (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1520; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1358; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1419; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1213). In fact, Kant claims that: "The greatest perfection of man is that of being able to act according to his power of choice, to direct his cognition to an object and again turn away from it" (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1231).²⁷ Even here in the Mrongovius lecture (1784-85), power of choice presupposes freedom, the freedom to choose between two different things – whether to pay attention to something or ignore it. This Kant calls the greatest perfection of man.

Conclusion

Kant defines prudence as using others for one's own ends and he articulates its end as happiness. Pursuing happiness also requires taking the inclinations and interest of other human beings into consideration and hence does not necessarily mean that a person is used

²⁷ Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in *Lectures on Anthropology*.

as a mere means. In order to pursue the end of happiness, one has to take the appropriate means to that end, and for that one needs freedom. This is not the freedom of the free will, however, it is freedom as power of choice. The power of choice allows one to choose between things and makes it possible to choose to use others as means also, while treating them as an end. The power of choice is, hence, free, and needs to be free in order to achieve its end. Thus, this solves the *aporia* that Brandt so artfully articulates.

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