Matej Szlávik’s Analysis of Kant’s Moral Philosophy

ONDREJ MARCHEVSKÝ

University of Prešov in Prešov, Slovakia

Abstract

Work of Immanuel Kant is subject matter of investigation not only in modern Slovak history. Already in the past, it had a great influence on intellectual development of Slovak region within The Kingdom of Hungary. One of the attentive and critical readers of Kant's works was Matej Szlávik, a professor of Evangelical College in Prešov. The study analyses Szlávik’s interpretation of Kant's works and it particularly focuses on analysis of Szlávik’s evaluations of Kant's practical and moral philosophy.

Keywords

Moral Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Slovak Philosophy, Kant, Szlávik, Criticism

This study reflects my interest to expound the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy within Slovak environment, or more precisely, in philosophy pursued within Slovak region of The Hungarian Kingdom. For the realization of this intention, I have chosen a significant professor of Prešov, Matej Szlávik. I am going to introduce briefly the persona of Matej Szlávik in selected bibliography as well as outline the Szlávik’s place in history of the Evangelical College in Prešov with respect to philosophy in order to specify the scope of investigation. The aim of this study is to critically assess the evaluation frameworks which Szlávik relates to Kant's moral philosophy, and also to discuss the selected aspects of his moral philosophy.

The Evangelical College in Prešov¹ was founded in 1666² and represented a significant educational institution, reputation of which was well-known far behind the

¹ Ondrej Marchevský is a research assistant at the Faculty of Arts, University of Prešov in Prešov, Slovakia.
Contact: ondrej333@gmail.com.
borders of The Hungarian Kingdom. Various authors agree that good repute of this College was built also by Matej Szlávik, who is considered to be one of the last professors of theology. He was zealous proponent of founding the university from this educational establishment. In order to outline the basic frameworks and placement of Szlávik in clearer picture of his era, I will give a definition and specification of active periods of the College with respect to an examination of philosophy. For the implementation of this intention I am going to use the extensive passage from the study of A. Kónyová grounded in the works of Jana Sošková Aesthetics of Michal Greguš³, Ondrej Mészárosz Philosophy at the College in Prešov in 19th century and the work of Andrej Vandrák⁴ and Anthology of professors of Evangelical College in Prešov⁵. Kónyová writes about the College: “Field of philosophy, or more precisely, of philosophical investigation was one of the dominant areas of exploration where the professors of the College excelled. This statement is valid foremost for the first period of the College’s active existence (1666-1711), when the philosophical thought was developed by personalities of The Hungarian Kingdom's science such as Ján Bayer (1630-1674), Izák Cabán (1638-1707), Eliáš Ladiver (1633-1686). Besides philosophical thought of I. Cabán, which combined modern rationalism and empiricism, modern and in that time up-to-date philosophy of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) penetrated to Prešov thanks to Bayer. A sort of the counterweight of new streams of thought in philosophy was represented by Ladiver's Protestant atomism. Other eminent representatives of philosophical examination at the Evangelical College in Prešov in 18th century were Ján Schwarz (1641-1728) and Ján Karlovský (1721-1794). While Schwartz was engaged in logic as well as in penetration of philosophy and Protestant theology, his younger colleague propagated thoughts of Ch. Wolf (1679-1754) and G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716). Karlovský's son Žigmund (1772-1821) became a disseminator of the Enlightenment philosophy, particularly of the Decartes' teaching. In the following period, Michal Greguš (1793-1838), who was specialized in aesthetics, excelled within the field of philosophy. Andrej Vandrák (1807-1884) attempted to build up his own philosophical system under the influence of Kant and Fries. Beside the philosophical works, Vandrák wrote many interesting works in psychology, logic and ethics. In the last stage of existence of the Evangelical College in Prešov, two professors significantly contributed to

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¹ Designated also as so called academic gymnasium (gymnasium academicum, gymnasium illustre, academia, lyceum, collegium). As stated by Červenka, academic gymnasium was very popular type of school that provided students with a lot of information and lectures from philosophy or subjects taught at other faculties. Academic gymnasia were established in 16th and 17th centuries mainly in smaller towns which did not have enough means to found own university (Červenka 1940, p. 99).

² In his work, Žilka states year 1667 (Žilka 1940, p. 13).

³ Title in Slovak: Estetika Michala Greguša.

⁴ Title in Slovak: Filozofia na prešovskom kolégiu v 19. storočí a dielo Andreja Vandráka.

⁵ Title in Slovak: Antológia z diel profesorov prešovského evanjelického kolégia.

For the completeness of this general introduction to Matej Szlávik and contemporary context of philosophy, I am going to mention a short biographic trait and give an idea of some of his works. Subsequently, I am going to outline the status of work which I would like to primarily deal with. I will not devote myself to a detailed biography, but I will give just a mention concerning Slávik's education and work. Szlávik achieved his secondary education at higher gymnasium in Rožňava, and he later continued in study at the Law Academy in Prešov. He obtained his doctoral degree after he successfully defended his dissertation titled *Die Reformation in Ungarn* (1884) at the university in Halle. He worked as a professor at the Theological Academy, where he taught dogmatic theology, philosophy, ethics, and history of pedagogy. He also lectured at the Law Academy. He acted as an academic functionary in several periods in a row – as a dean of the Theological Academy and also as a rector of the Evangelical College in Prešov. He worked in Budapest as well. He wrote many works, among which two-volume *History of Philosophy* (1888) can be mentioned. The first volume focuses on ancient philosophy. The second one deals with medieval and modern philosophy. In the concluding parts, he elaborated an overview of French, English, American philosophy of his era as well as of philosophical thought in individual European countries. The second volume contains also the interpretation of Comte. This Szlávik's work is often criticized for an absence of detailed interest in Hungarian philosophy. Worth of mentioning are also the following works: *Theological-Ethical Characteristics of Goethe and Faust* (1886), *From the History of the Latest Theology* (1887), *Question of Free Will* (1896). Szlávik was also prolific contributor to specialized periodicals such as *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* or *Protestáns szemle*, in which he published his articles, e.g. *Tolstojés keresztenesség* and also *Platon és Krisztus*.

I am going to focus my attention on Szlávik's work *Kant's Ethics* (*Kant ethikája*), which was translated from Hungarian to Slovak by already mentioned Annamária Kónyová, who also supplemented the translation with a short commentary (Kónyová 2011, pp. 291-294). Szlávik's philosophical study has been originally published in Árpád Kósch book printed in Prešov in 1894. It was dedicated to Pavol Zelenkai, the bishop of the Potiský district of the Augsburg Confession. The study consists of the introduction and three thematic sections. I focus my attention primarily on the first and second section titled *Basic Principles of Ethics* and *Critique of Basic Principles*. However, I will not omit

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6 Title in Slovak: *Dejiny filozofie.*
7 Title in Slovak: *Teologicko-etická charakteristika Goetheho a Fausta.*
8 Title in Slovak: *Z dejín najnovší teológie.*
9 Title in Slovak: *K otázke slobodnej vôle.*
10 Title in Slovak: *Kantova etika.*
11 Title in Slovak: *Základné princípy etiky.*
12 Title in Slovak: *Kritika základných princípov.*
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the introduction and the third section of Szlávik's study titled *Followers and Objectors of Basic Principles*[^13]. In the introductory notes, Szlávik designates Immanuel Kant as the embodiment of the German Enlightenment in philosophy. In other words, German Enlightenment acquires its fulfilment in the figure of Kant and his philosophy within the field of philosophy, similarly as it does in the state of Frederick the Great in the case of politics, and in the works of Lessing within the literature (Szlávik 2011, p. 294). The introduction is also full of words of respect and admiration towards Immanuel Kant and his philosophy. Szlávik describes Kant as a thinker who instantly influenced all the fields of human education. According to the professor of Prešov, Kant's thoughts “became the basic elements of our education” (Szlávik 2011, p. 295). It should be noted that the author formulated this evaluating statement in 1894. He paid an extraordinary attention to Kant's exhortation to independent thinking on several places of the introduction and also within the whole of his study. He writes: “After all, Kant is the philosopher, who not only provided to us completed thoughts, but also impels us to independent thinking” (Szlávik 2011, p. 295). Just the moment of critical thinking is emphasized by one of Slovak historians of philosophy, who answers the question of the great influence of Kant's philosophy on Slovak intellectual environment. According to Münz, Kant influenced Slovak philosophy foremost by pointing to significance of subject in the process of cognition, by moving subject to foreground and ceased to see in it only passively reflecting factor, but he noticed its active and specific function in reproduction of object (Münz 1961, p. 148).

In the same line of thought, Münz adds: “...requirement of independence in thinking and acting contained also requirement of criticalness in cognition” (Münz 1961, p. 148). The introductory part of Szlávik's work is important also for overall character of this study. Actually, it is the place where the professor of Prešov formulates the subject matter of Kant's philosophical investigation, which is, according to his words, thinking and desiring man (Szlávik 2011, p. 295).

Let me mention one more example of significance of *Introduction* for the structure of this study. It is just the *Introduction* where the central question problematized in two following sections is formulated. Szlávik asks: *What does Kant as a philosopher of morals teach?* (Szlávik 2011, p. 295). Besides the already mentioned two central sections of Szlávik's work, this question directly relates also to the third section of the work, which is devoted to evaluation of Kant's influence on European philosophy and philosophy within the territory of The Hungarian Kingdom. Special attention is paid just to Kant's influence on philosophical environment in The Hungarian Kingdom. In the introduction of his work, Szlávik declares also endeavour to answer the central question by analysis of domestic philosophical environment (i.e. of The Hungarian Kingdom which at the time involved also the region of present-day Slovakia). Let me note, that this Szlávik's endeavour is not

[^13]: Title in Slovak: *Nasledovníci a odporcovia základných princípov.*
very observable nor satisfactory fulfilled. There are only fragmentary statements and notes including the division of philosophers to those who accepted and developed Kant's philosophy and to those who criticized it. However, problematized third section of Szlávik's work can be seen as a noteworthy source of information concerning the Hungarian Kingdom's authors dealing with Kant and also as a depiction of interest in philosophical legacy of this thinker. Szlávik mentions particular works and authors. In this context, Szlávik’s exact enumerating of issues of journals such as Felsomagyarországy Minerva or Tudományos Gyűjtemény dedicated to Kant's philosophy and its critical analysis is particularly interesting. I consider the contribution of the translator in the form of a footnote recalling O. Mészaros who mentions further supplementing sources to those named by Szlávik to be notably useful.

So, what does Kant, as a philosopher of morals, teach? Szlávik tries to answer this question by the means of analysis of Kant's works Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. He considers the last mentioned work to be of pure and fresh climate contrary to eudaemonistic works of English and French provenance. In connection with this work, Szlávik adds: “Kant's noble and uplifting character as well as depth of his basic ethical thoughts enchants us via this work” (Szlávik 2011, p. 295). By contrast, Szlávik regards Kant's work Kritik der praktischen Vernunft being a gateway into the mystery of Kant's morality, which, according to Szlávik, represents: “the completion of his philosophy” (Szlávik 2011, p. 296). In presenting this his conviction, he refers also to the sequence of publishing Kant's works. Szlávik considers him to be the author of system of idealistic moral philosophy which is based on immediate certainty of morals. Besides the statement concerning Kant's fundamental subject matter of philosophy in the form of thinking and desiring man, the establishing of moral philosophy on immediate certainty of morals represents another uncovering of elementary principles that Szlávik is looking for. Following from these grounds, Szlávik subsequently interprets the purpose of theoretical reflection within morality as well as the priority of practical reason over the speculative theoretical one. According to Szlávik, Kant's moral philosophy differs from contemporary (18th century) English, French and German ethical conceptions of dogmatic-metaphysical character by “defining his own ethical conception in fundamental lines of metaphysics of morals” (Szlávik 2011, p. 296). In Szlávik's understanding, Kant's efforts aimed at a formation, or more precisely, a determination of distinctive world of moral consciousness.

In the given context, Szlávik proceeds with his analysis of fundamental principles as follows:

Starting point of the given system is that a world of ethical ideas, regardless of interests, does not have final, empirical and sensual character, but ideal, transcendental and eternal one (Szlávik 2011, p. 297).

Subsequently Szlávik puts to forefront the term of autonomy of morals which is independent on our subjectively seen options, and thus it becomes determinative for us.
Szlávik emphasizes that it is a question of cognition or non-cognition to a certain extent. But it does not mean that one cannot penetrate to these determinative principles at all. Szlávik only concerns to what extent we do recognize these principles. He does not determine overall potential that they have for us. He does not define to what extent these principles are and can be determinative for us. Within the intentions of Kant's philosophical legacy, Szlávik emphasizes the essential difference between morality and natural activity of one's life. Morality is an originator of new world of freedom and responsibility. It causes that principle of personality becomes a manifestation of independence on mechanisms of natural existence. Szlávik here insists on essential difference between moral act and some fact of natural behaviour. From these efforts to clarify the basic pillars of Kant's morals stems another Szlávik's result in this field. Particularly, he terms the natural in man as something impure, as something the morality has to be purified and saved from. We have to care about its immaculateness. Szlávik considers this to be the principal task within forming the fundamental lines of Kant's metaphysics of morals.

Szlávik continues his analysis with the problem of a good will, which he considers to be necessary for clarifying Kant's moral philosophy. Referring to the first part of the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Szlávik regards the good will to be the only good thing among all the understandable things, which value resides in itself without any determination of purposes of action. It is determined only and exclusively by the irrevocable principle and validity of will. According to Szlávik, the will, which is independent on sensuality and determined solely by reason, becomes the essence of morals in Kant's thought. This argument serves for the interpreter of Kant as the ground for rationalization of purely formal character of moral principle, which is subsequently moved to legal level. This shift comes quite suddenly. As if Szlávik breaks his own sequence of steps of argumentation as well as announced structure of analysis of the central problem. In his view, the respect towards law becomes determinative for good will. The explanation of his understanding of good will outlined in intentions of the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* and its determination by law absents here. I consider it to be particularly necessary, since by this way Szlávik explains also the place and value of categorical imperative which is binding for all the other imperatives. In this context Szlávik admits the possibility of such moral principle that is independent on all experience, but at the same time represents the general law for all the reasonable beings. Based on these thoughts, Szlávik derives also the absolute value of reasonable being, which he calls personality. Just thinking about absolute value of rational being (personality), Szlávik regards to be the one of the most standing ideas of Kant's morals. Referring to Janet Paul, Szlávik talks about a certain “theory of humankind” (Szlávik 2011, p. 298).

He deliberates about specific dignity of morals in terms of being a legislator. That means, the morals provides laws for itself, and by this way it attains the validity of law itself without any need of external interventions.
Szlávik's reflections on duty follow from this character of law's validity. He presents here Kant's pathetic exclamation from the *Critique of Practical Reason*: “Duty, you great noble name”. Duty is inherent only to personality, to rational being which is freed from all the natural mechanisms and subordinated to the moral law. At the same time he is aware of necessity of this subordination. It is inevitable to remark, that not every man is a personality, similarly as not every inhabitant of a state is its citizen. This motive is emphasized also by Kant himself. Within his investigation of Kant's practical philosophy, Szlávik carefully pays his attention to the question of distinguishing a man, or better said, a person from a personality. The basis of this differentness is dual character of a man, his double status. The next Szlávik's statement confirms that the common denominator of this differentiation is a man as a substantial basis: “In freedom, the higher essence of a personality manifests itself and a man as morally free spirit lives in higher moral world order” (Szlávik 2011, p. 300). On the one side, there is a man – a person as a part of natural mechanisms of the sensual world, but on the other side, there is a man – a personality standing over a person, because: “… he creates the independent causality of particular will and action” (Szlávik 2011, p. 299). The moral law of conscience is determinative here.

Szlávik subsequently formulates a fundamental idea:

Similarly as Newton with his universal law of gravitation turned the physical world upside down, Kant did the same with the world of morals by discovering morality within ourselves. By doing so, he made the morality independent not only on nature, but also on God.

Szlávik thereafter adds:

dependence of morals on God is according to Kant a heteronomy which contradicts to nobility of moral law; since morals does not need any idea of a third being standing beyond man to admitting and fulfilment of duty (Szlávik 2011, pp. 298-299).

The above quoted passage can serve as an example of summary of Szlávik's attitudes in relation to Kant within the field of moral philosophy, and at the same time it determines one of the fundamental frameworks Szlávik makes efforts to cope with. Namely, it regards the term of God and his place in such moral thinking. It forms a direct connection to a framework of comparison of Kant's teaching with Christian ethics as well as to the second thematic section of Szlávik's study, which I have already referred to above.

Let me quote one more passage from Szlávik's philosophical study in order to approach his interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy and its foundations:

According to Kant, moral law sanctifying the freedom of will is identical to inevitable binding law of conscience, which real ground resides in the true moral sense, its form lies in categorical imperative and the direct consequence consists in independence of categorically required.
Szlávik points to one more essential aspect:

Freedom of will is the attribute of reason through which we have an access to absolute causality, own legislation and self-determination (Szlávik 2011, p. 300).

With respect to overall structure of Szlávik's study, I perceive the given passage as a certain summary that becomes the foundation for further sequence of the work. It gains a character of comparison with already mentioned Christian moral teaching, which forms the basic pillars of Szlávik's criticism as well as of my attempt at critical reassessment of Szlávik's attitudes.

For Szlávik, Christian grounds and religious belief of a believer are symptomatic and essentially form his approach to Kant's work. If I mentioned that last cited passages represent a sort of basis for further work and consequent criticism, the evidences can be found several lines below, where Szlávik, in relation to the term conscience, states:

In his teaching concerning the conscience, Kant mostly approximates to attitude of Christian ethics. Our conscience is nothing else than a mouthpiece of our intelligible essence and categorical imperative manifests itself just in conscience (Szlávik 2011, p. 300).

Besides the mentioned qualities of Kant's work, Szlávik praises his legacy in connection with understanding of freedom based on man's ethical character: “At this point, Kant reminds to a man as an intelligible being of supersensible world such a strict yet uplifting things concerning his moral mission, which resemble rigorous Christian ethics” (Szlávik 2011, p. 300). “It reminds”, “it approximates”, these are the formulations related by Szlávik to Kant's moral philosophy. As the following statement confirms, clarity and paramountcy of Christian morality together with a belief in it becomes Szlávik's primary evaluating framework of Kant's legacy:

[...] well-known formula ‘you can because you must’ insufficiently expresses Christian moral world view. His (sc. understood by Kant) is only a form, an abstract power which does not have objective base. Therefore, Kant is not able to create general laws of correct and binding action (Szlávik 2011, p. 301).

According to my opinion, the statement epitomizes the key deficiency of Szlávik's work with Kant. By creating the Christian referential framework based on God, Szlávik primarily sets the obstacle for interpretation of Kant. Similar religiously based criticism can be found e.g. in the Russian thinkers of 19th century who were Szlávik's
contemporaries. Szlávik reproaches Kant for inability to establish the objective infallibility to his words. Nonetheless, Szlávik does not explain how he understands this objective infallibility. Subsequently, he critically comments on Kant's opinions concerning the function of the Church as a means of attainment the realm of purposes realized through moral laws. Szlávik considers the work *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* to be Kant's effort to moralize Christianity, however he does not intend to occupy himself with the topic directly.

The first section of Szlávik's philosophical study contains few more notes regarding Kant's practical philosophy. The author deals with the semantic differentiation of terms *Rechtspflicht* and *Tugendpflicht*. According to Szlávik, two branches of practical philosophy arise from this differentiation: “on the one hand, there is the ethics arranging the intrinsic free life, and on the other there is the theory of law concerning the order of social coexistence” (Szlávik 2011, p. 302).

Within the given context of Kant's practical philosophy, Szlávik highly appreciates Kant's insisting on fundamentals of intrinsic moral freedom for an attainment and implementation of legal and political freedom as an external freedom. I think that the essential motive of education (*Bildung*) which could help to clarify some of the author's attitudes is absent here. Peter Kyslan points to this motive by referring to Kant's work *Über Pädagogik*. He reveals the semantic level of the term *Bildung* in moral education and moves this term to the level of Kant's project of history (Kyslan 2010, pp. 278-282).

Besides the already mentioned title *Critique of Basic Principles*, thematic directing of the second section of Szlávik's philosophical study has been suggested also by critical notes and evaluations of the first section. What emerged in previous section only in form of short remarks represents here the main interest. Already in the second paragraph, Szlávik formulates one of the essential objections, while he maintains his respect to Kant's work: “Despite of pure and noble understanding of morality, the abstract formalism following from transcendent character of reason superior to sensuality is one of the basic mistakes” (Szlávik 2011, p. 303.) In my opinion, the following idea represents two key motives in relation to Kant, which Szlávik attempts to critically cope with:

Kant's ethics does not take into account the concrete humankind as the real actuality nor its historical development, but only the individual removed from human society, history, and from his relation to God (Szlávik 2011, p. 303).

First of all, let me raise an objection to emptiness and not argued postulation of alleged removal of individual from human society. In my view, this fully contradicts the unsociable sociable (ungleisliche Geselligkeit) character of man, which is natural and represents a driving engine of human progress, negative sides of which should be reduced in order to enable the development of an individual. Inclusion of the individual in society is

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14 Within a rich tradition of the Kantian conferences in Prešov, professor Nizhnikov dealt with this motive in several of his contributions. The following one may serve as an example: Нижников 2010. pp. 125-136.
fundamental feature of the unsociable sociable character of a man. Szlávik refers to a frequent term the real actuality, which Kant allegedly did not have in his armamentarium. Criticism formulated in this way appears often in this section of Szlávik's study. I presume that given criticism is not based on misapprehension of real actuality and concrete humankind, but the problem lies in collision of two world views – Szlávik's one and Kant's one. The collision follows from establishing the priority of one framework of understanding the real actuality over the other. As I outlined above, Kant is criticized for his inappropriate relationship to God that represents the principal problem in Szlávik's analysis. The most apt expression of Szlávik's stance concerning this question can be found in the following statement:

Kant's system lacks the most important part, teaching about goodness. He was not able to derive all the benefactions from the single good, from the God, and thus his teaching regarding virtue and duty is lifeless and empty (Szlávik 2011, p. 304).

Just the absence of reference to God as a source of everything can be seen as the central reproof, which underlies the whole study and culminates in aforesaid Szlávik's statement. Such a conviction can be confirmed also with notes of Jaromír Červenka, who in his work *The Evangelical College in Prešov in History of Philosophy*\(^\text{15}\) writes:

he (sc. Szlávik) can be considered to be an adherent of Kant's philosophy. He was a little bit influenced also by Hegel and by some of Hegel's epigones – accordingly not less by great German philosopher Kuno Fischer, ..., however his fundamental Kantian line does not seem to be broken (Červenka 1940, p. 135).

Subsequently Červenka adds the essential remark: “Of course, he still remains a theologian and always primarily emphasizes the religious and Christian view” (Červenka 1940, p. 135). I arrive at a conviction that Szlávik's analytical approach is to a great extent misted by his personal opinion and belief. It can be seen in various statements similar to the following one, where Szlávik in relation to Kant's understanding of man writes: “He forgot that natural desires and dispositions are not only selfish and sensual, but there are also higher and morally noble desires and dispositions within man”. On the same page he continues as follows:

And finally, Kant also forgot that the aim of our moral mission is not a virtue defined in stiff fight between duty and dispositions, but a truly free and beautiful morality within which dispositions are in balance with duty, and within which goodness is no more considered to be a painful necessity, but gratifying good (Szlávik 2011, p. 304).

\(^{15}\) Title in Slovak: *Prešovské Evanjelické kolégium v dejínách filozofie*. 

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I basically disagree with such an attitude. I do not think Kant would be oblivious of these dispositions. He does not deny that the man does have these dispositions, but he insists on the idea that this good side of man cannot be reliable for a fulfilment of historical purposes and aims. Such considerations and evaluating stances lead me to a conviction that these approaches are incommensurable. The incommensurability lies in differentness of key bases.

Let me yield the concluding evaluation of Szlávik's attitude to Kant, which according to me, expresses the extent of his admiration as well as the need to cope with the legacy of Kant's work, to Szlávik himself: “In short: we are dealing with rigidly one-sided legitimate morality and with excellent pedagogue of real ethical freedom, whose influence on pure formal creating of personality is undeniable” (Szlávik 2011, p. 304). For the conclusion of this study, I would like to state that I cannot identify with this Szlávik's opinion.

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