Lambert’s Influence on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy

La Influencia de Lambert en la Filosofía Teórica de Kant

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Abstract

This paper aims at presenting a reconstruction of the main theses of Lambert’s thought and their role in the establishment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In order to do so, the paper is divided into three sections. Initially, a consideration of Lambert’s attempt to assure illusion (Schein) within the domain of phenomenology (Körperwelt) and to institute the domain of metaphysical truth (Intellectualwelt) is carried out. Secondly, Kant’s first step away from Lambert’s proposal, which is presented in the Inaugural Dissertation’s thesis that the sensible and intellectual domains of knowledge are grounded upon two distinct and intransmutable faculties, is taken into account. Finally, Kant’s definitive step away from Lambert’s proposal, i.e., the justification of appearances in the Duisburg Nachlaß in an objective and non-illusory domain, due to the determination of the faculty of understanding, is pointed out.

Keywords

Appearance; Illusion; Sensibility; Understanding; Johann Heinrich Lambert.

Resumen

Este artículo presenta una reconstrucción de las principales tesis del pensamiento de Lambert y sus contribuciones a la formación de la filosofía teórica de Kant. Para ello, el artículo se divide en tres partes. En un primer momento, se desarrolla una consideración del intento de Lambert de garantizar la ilusión (Schein) en el campo de la fenomenología (Körperwelt) y de instituir el dominio de la verdad metafísica (Intellectualwelt). En un segundo momento, se considera el primer paso de Kant en su alejamiento de la propuesta de Lambert, que se presenta en la tesis de la Disertación Inaugural de que los campos sensibles e intelectuales de los conocimientos se basan en dos facultades distintas e intransmutables. Por último, se trata del paso final de Kant en su alejamiento de la propuesta de Lambert, esto es, de la justificación de los fenómenos en Duisburg

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Nachläß en un dominio objetivo y no ilusorio, debido a la determinación de la facultad de entendimiento.

Palabras clave

Fenómeno; Ilusión; Sensibilidad; Entendimiento; Johann Heinrich Lambert.

1. Introduction

Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777) takes the chief end of any philosophical investigation to be the transition from the "domain of illusion” to the “domain of truth”. Kant precisely describes the main task of his theoretical philosophy – i.e., the establishment of the conditions of possibility of knowledge of objects as appearances – contrasting Lambert’s methodological proposal: “[at] issue here is not the transformation of illusion [Schein] into truth [Wahrheit], but of appearance [Erscheinung] into experience [Erfahrung]”.

This reference, by itself, seems to call for a consideration of Lambert’s work as well as of his correspondence established with Kant, in order to properly catch sight of Kant’s critical approach of the referred task. At least from what is documented, it can be said that Kant had contact with Lambert’s ideas during five years in the pre-critical period. Kant’s statements in the correspondence from 1765 to 1770 show that he knew the main theses of Lambert’s work and that he was deeply influenced by them and the ideas sent to him by Lambert. Worth mentioning here that in 1765 Kant held Lambert to be “the greatest genius in Germany”, that the suggestions within Lambert’ s letters were the ground of Kant’s pre-critical constant postponement in publicizing his philosophical investigations, and that a draft of Kant’s intention to dedicate the work which would become his magnum opus to Lambert has been preserved.

This paper aims at reconstructing central ideas of Lambert’s works as well as specific moments of his dialogue with Kant in the pre-critical period, so as to sustain the thesis that the critical distinction between appearance (Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein) is deeply indebted to Lambert’s thought and his ideas exchanged with Kant. The thesis is supported by three moments of argumentation.

1 Kant, MAN, AA 04: 554. Friedman translates “Schein” as “semblance”.
3 See Kant, Br, AA 10: 096.
4 See Kant, Refl, (Reflexion 5024) AA 18: 064. [1776-1778]. Peters (1968, p. 453) and Piché (2004, p. 45) called attention to this fact.
5 This thesis, in its letter, would be already presented by Piché (2004, pp. 45-67) in his “Kant, heredero del método fenomenológico de Lambert”. I do not follow Piché’s approach though, since I don’t agree with his consideration of Kant as inheriting Lambert’s phenomenological method. I think that Piché lacks a systematic approach to Kant’s pre-critical headway and, therefore, does not properly understand Kant’s split-up with Lambert’s position already in the pre-critical period. As an example, one could point out his insistence that “[s]e puede comprender el entusiasmo de Kant cuando le hace llegar a Lambert su Dissertatio. Él cree haberse inspirado tan bien en el método de éste último, que es capaz de pretender que su texto es
In a first section, Lambert’s proposal, as it is presented in his main works, is considered. It is sustained that Lambert takes the concept of illusion (\textit{Schein}) to be the concept from which the philosopher must depart in order to reach the distinction of truth. For that, it will be important, firstly, to call attention to the manner in which Lambert structures the corporeal world (\textit{Körperwelt}), which, as a world of illusion, is ruled by phenomenology. Secondly, it will also be essential a consideration of Lambert’s intention to establish a similarity or comparison between the corporeal world (\textit{Körperwelt}), or domain of illusion, and the intellectual world (\textit{Intellectualwelt}), or domain of truth ruled by metaphysics.

In a second section, Kant’s attempt at overcoming Lambert’s proposal in the central theorems of the \textit{Inaugural Dissertation} of 1770 is examined. It is maintained that, in establishing an intransmutability between the sensible and intellectual domains, the \textit{Inaugural Dissertation} presents Kant’s first step away from Lambert’s proposal as well as his first consideration on the relation between sensible and intellectual models of representation.

In a third section, the constitution of an objective whole of appearances in the \textit{Reflexionen} of the \textit{Duisburg Nachlaß} due to a necessary determination by the concepts of the understanding is approached. It is argued that, in abandoning the \textit{Dissertation}’s position, these reflections constitute the definitive step away from Lambert’s proposal. In other words, this new approach holds the methodological presupposition that is necessary for the justification of appearances (\textit{Erscheinungen}), not within the domain of illusion, but in an objective whole of their relations conceived as experience.

2. Illusion (\textit{Schein}) as the fundamental concept of Philosophy in Lambert

The term “illusion” (\textit{Schein}) received particular attention in the argumentation of the philosopher and mathematician Johann Heinrich Lambert. By the year 1764, Lambert had published a work entitled \textit{New Organon or Thoughts on the Investigation of Truth and the Distinction Between Error and Illusion}, in which he conceives a distinction between the “intellectual world” (\textit{Intellectualwelt}) and the “corporeal world” (\textit{Körperwelt}), i.e., between the domain of truth (\textit{Wahrheit}) and the domain of illusion (\textit{Schein}). The fourth and last part of the \textit{New Organon} is entitled \textit{Phenomenology} or “doctrine of illusion”. According to Lambert, phenomenology “[…] must make illusion recognized and present…’fenomenológico’ de un extremo al otro”. (Piché, 2004, p. 55). Contrasting Piché’s consideration, Laywine (2001, p.1) argues that “[t]he chief motivation for writing the \textit{Inaugural Dissertation} was to preserve metaphysics, so conceived, from the taint of sensibility”. Following Laywine, Beck (1996, p. 411) argues that “as soon as Kant began to follow the ‘new path’ opened by his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, there was no more of central philosophical importance that he could learn from Lambert”. In this paper, I sustain that Kant’s pre-critical approach presents two indispensable steps for moving away from Lambert’s proposal, which are given in the 1770 \textit{Dissertatio} and the ensuing \textit{Duisburg Nachlaß} reflections.
all the manners to avoid it and to come to the recognition of truth”.⁶ In other words, phenomenology considers the “[...] theory of illusion and its consequences for the precision and imprecision of human knowledge”.⁷ In what matters to this, Lambert assures that

«[...] little had appeared in the doctrines of reason regarding phenomenology, notwithstanding the great necessity to distinguish the true from the illusory. Certainly it is not focused on the logical truth, but on the metaphysical truth, since to a great extent illusion [Schein] is opposed to the real. In fact, it is always an error when a thing, as it really is, is confused with its illusion: and again one believes in errors since they give the illusion [scheinen] of being true».⁸

According to what is considered in this passage, it can be said that Lambert takes illusion (Schein) to be indispensable for the “precision of knowledge” or for “metaphysical truth”. That is to say, the concept of illusion is for Lambert basically the key-concept of metaphysics. Therefore, the task to be carried out is not related to a confusion due to the relation of concepts, as in the logical truth, but due to a confusion of “a thing as it really is” and “its illusion”. In a word, Lambert’s doctrine holds the concept of illusion to be essentially connected with the task of guaranteeing metaphysical truth in what matters to the ontological domain of things. It is from this domain, initially presented as a “domain of illusion”, that the metaphysician must depart to reach the “domain of truth”.

The answer to the problem of metaphysical truth, as it is presented here, relies fundamentally on the answer to these questions: (i.) what is the status of phenomenology while treating the problem of illusion in light of the dichotomy of the corporeal and intellectual worlds?; (ii.) how the determination of metaphysical truth, i.e., the presentation of real truth in opposition to illusion, is given?

The first question can be answered within the fourth section of the New Organon. It is in this section that Lambert considers that phenomenology is not sufficient for the establishment of metaphysics as a science. Phenomenology, for Lambert, is just a propaedeutic science for metaphysics as such, i.e., phenomenology is the science through which it is possible “[...] to achieve truth beginning from illusion”.⁹ This means that phenomenology cannot consider the intellectual world or the domain of truth in a constitutive way. That is, phenomenology never approaches truth or the true as such, but only the “illusion of truth” (Schein des Wahren) or the “verisimilitude” (Wahrscheinlichkeit).¹⁰ In short, in being restricted to the corporeal world or the domain of illusion, phenomenology can never establish itself as a science of investigation of truth, i.e., as a metaphysics.

⁶ Lambert, Neues Organon. Vorrede, IV. In this and the following quotations from Lambert’s corpus, translation is my own.
⁸ Lambert, Neues Organon. Vorrede, XI.
⁹ Lambert, Neues Organon. Phänomenologie, § 1. Italics added.
¹⁰ See Lambert, Neues Organon. Phänomenologie, § 149.
The answer to the second question, which regards the determination of metaphysical truth in the intellectual world, is given in the *Architectonic* of 1771:

«We do not wish to cite each part of human knowledge individually, but we prefer rather to distinguish them into two classes. Some concern the intellectual world; others the corporeal world. The names of things in the intellectual world are taken from things in the corporeal world (to the extent that things in one world resemble things in the other, according to our way of representing them)».11

From this common mode of representation, set up in face of the dichotomy of the corporeal and intellectual worlds, Lambert takes verisimilar things as having the same status as true things, for the latter can only be conceptually represented from the domain of verisimilitude; and this on the ground of both the configuration of the corporeal world as a domain of illusion and the impossibility of a constitutive analysis of the intellectual world.

In a letter to Kant from 1770 Lambert spells out his position on the determination of metaphysical truth:

«[…] it is also useful in ontology to take up concepts borrowed from illusion [Schein], since the theory must finally be applied to the phenomena [Phaenomenis] again. For that it is also how the astronomer begins, with the phenomenon [Phaenomeno]; deriving his theory of the construction of the world from phenomena [Phaenomena], he applies it again to phenomena and their prediction in his ephemerides [star calendars]. In metaphysics, where the problem of illusion (Schein) is so essential, the method of the astronomer will surely be the safest. The metaphysician can take everything to be illusion [Schein], separate the empty illusion from the real illusion, and from the real illusion draw the true».12

Three points call for a consideration here: (i.) Lambert equalizes phenomenon and illusion (Schein); (ii.) hence, the metaphysician, just like the astronomer, must begin from the phenomenon or from illusion, formulate his theory, and, in the end, apply it again to phenomenal or illusory things; (iii.) finally, this modus operandi of the metaphysician is specified in three steps: (iii.i) the admissibility of everything as being illusion, (iii.ii) the distinction of real illusion from empty illusion, (iii.iii) the inference of the true from the real illusion.

The justification of how this transition, from the admissibility of everything as illusory to the theorization of metaphysical truth, and the further application of this truth again to the phenomenon, take place is not given in any of Lambert’s works, nor is it in the whole of his doctrine. The deadlock inherent in the equalization of phenomenon and illusion and, thereby, in the methodological presupposition that the metaphysical domain of truth could only be approached from the domain of illusion would be the impulse for Kant’s work on a new solution to the problem.

12 Kant, *Br*, AA 10: 108. Zweig translates “Schein” as “appearance” and “[…] aus dem reellen auf das wahre schließen” as “draw true conclusions from the latter”.
3. Kant’s position in the Inaugural Dissertation

In the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, while translating Lambert’s methodological nomenclature of the Intellectualwelt and the Körperwelt into mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis, Kant understands that phenomenology, as the science governing the “sensible world”, is a “purely negative science”. Its single task it to assure that “[…] the principles of sensibility, their validity and their limitations, would be determined, so that these principles could not be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason” in the domain of metaphysics. That is, the guarantee that “[…] extremely mistaken conclusions emerge if we apply the basic concepts of sensibility to something that is not at all an object of the sense”.13 In a word, Lambert’s thesis that the domain of metaphysics should be known by a certain “similarity” with the domain of phenomenology is totally dismissed. Indeed, one can say that to secure the domain of metaphysics, as ruled by a purely intellectual faculty, from this “similarity” with the domain of the phenomena, governed by the sensible faculty, is the raison d’être of the Inaugural Dissertation.14 In Kant’s words: “Every method employed by metaphysics, in dealing with what is sensitive and what belongs to the understanding, amounts, in particular, to this prescription: great care must be taken lest the principles which are native to sensitive cognition transgress their limits, and affect what belongs to the understanding”.15

Being given now this “dissimilarity” between the sensible and the intellectual domains, it is worth considering whether (and how) Kant in fact holds the foundation of knowledge to imply a possible relation between them in the Dissertation. 

In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant characterizes this relation in a merely logical sense. The reason for Kant’s account of a relation between sensible and intellectual representations of objects not in an essential but merely logical sense is that the referred thesis of the “dissimilarity” between the domains of these representations has as its systematic outcome the fact that the domain of sensible representation, or of objects as phenomena, is merely and exclusively determined by sensibility. That is, a universal concept of understanding has no determination whatsoever in what matters to this domain. According to what is stated in the Dissertation, Space and time alone establish the determination of phenomena and, as a result, assure the principles of the form of the sensible world and its distinction in relation to the intelligible world. By the same token,

13 Kant, Br, AA 10: 98. All passages quoted from Kant’s letter to Lambert from 1770, in which, along with a copy of his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant asks for Lambert’s judgment on its main theses.
14 Laywine (2001, pp. 5-6) points out that “Lambert was interested in general metaphysics, not for the sake of special metaphysics, but rather for the sake of the exact sciences”; while “Kant was interested in general metaphysics precisely for the sake of special metaphysics”. According to Laywine (2001, p. 5), “[t]o lay the foundations of a rigorous science of immaterial things was Kant’s central philosophical project in the mid-1750s”. Beck (1996, pp. 408, 410), argues that Kant did not follow Lambert precisely because the latter took metaphysics to be a “transcendent optics” and, therefore, guided his investigations by the principle that they are limited, in what matters to their objects and their understanding, to what can be weighted and calculated. 15 Kant, MSI, AA. 02: 411.
this intelligible world does not find in the conditions of sensibility any limitation or reference of the concepts of the understanding.

From a critical view, one can say that, aside from this outcome, by 1770 Kant already had in mind a lack of correspondence between the concepts of phenomenon (phaenomenon) or appearance (Erscheinung) and the concept of illusion (Schein). Moreover, the argumentation in the Dissertation constitutes a first step in treating Lamberts impasse, which held the domain of phenomena to be illusory (Scheinbar). In a word, notwithstanding the lack of any essential relation between sensible and intellectual domains, the Inaugural Dissertation already dismisses Lambert’s attempt to equalize them as useless. For, the domain of the senses or of the phaenomenis is originally presented in this work as a domain of the apparentia and not of illusion (Schein).16

The Dissertation does not justify the equivalence of the concepts of phaenomenon and apparentia. This would be a task for Kant’s Reflexionen in the decade of 1770. In these Reflexionen, the methodological consideration of the Dissertation, holding the domain of sensibility to be a domain of phaenomena and the domain of understanding to be a domain of noumena, would be abandoned.

4. The necessity of a determination of appearances by the faculty of understanding in the Duisburg Nachlaß

A question set by Lambert already in 1770 would be the motivation of Kant’s investigations in the following years. To put in the words that give Lambert’s evaluation of the Dissertation:

«The first main thesis is that human knowledge, by virtue of being knowledge and by virtue of sharing its own form, is divided in accordance with the old phaenomenon and noumenon distinction and, accordingly, arises out of two entirely different, and so to speak, heterogeneous sources, so that what stems from the one source can never be derived from the other. Knowledge that comes from the senses thus is and remains sensible, just as knowledge that comes from the understanding remains peculiar to the understanding. My thoughts on this proposition have to do manly with the question of generality, namely, to what extent these two ways of knowing are so completely separated that they never come together. If is to be proved [bewiesen] a priori, it must be deduced from the nature of the senses and of the understanding».17

Worth noting that Lambert regards that Kant could only sustain, or “prove a priori”, the distinction of sensible and intellectual knowledge provided that this demonstration would be undertaken by a consideration of both understanding and sensibility.

Kant would see this indication not as a way to “prove a priori” the segregation of knowledge into sensible and intellectual, but actually as an impulse to rethink the

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16 See Kant, MSI, AA 02: 394.
17 Kant, Br, AA 10: 105. Zweig translates “bewiesen” as “shown”.

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methodological presupposition of the Dissertation which grounded it. As stated by a Reflexion of the end of the 1770s:

«It has taken a long time for the concepts to become so ordered for me that I could see them as comprising a whole and clearly indicating the boundaries of the science that I planned. I already had the idea of the influence of the subjective conditions of cognition on the objective ones prior to the disputation [of the Dissertation], and afterwards the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual. But for me the latter was merely negative». 18

Several passages from the Duisburg Nachlaß document the fact that Kant paid particular attention to the question put by Lambert and that he did try to present an answer to it within this period. In these Reflexionen, Kant distinguishes Erscheinung, associating it with the terms apparentia and phaenomenon, from the term Schein, which is associated with the terms Scheinbar and Illusion. Although Lambert’s question was significant, his solution was not correct because it should have been given in the context of the phenomenon or appearance and not of the illusory or apparent. Worth considering are the following Reflexionen:

«[i.] Apparentia (phaenomenon), appearance [Erscheinung] (what is presented Before the thing itself)

[…] the illusion [der Schein] (apparent) [Scheinbar]). 19

[ii.] The appearance [Erscheinung] and the illusion [Schein] are two different things. The former emerges when the object is given and the latter when the object is thought. In an appearance [Erscheinung] the apparent [apparentz] is grounded on the judgment about the affection of the senses; and, when it is real it remains phaenomenon. 20

[iii.] Apparentia is that in the appearance [Erscheinung] which is a ground, it is established from an object which agrees with its concept.

[…] An illusion [Schein] is Illusion». 21

The approach of the problem in the Duisburg Nachlaß is revolutionary in this respect: Kant abandons the thesis of the intransmutability of the sensible and intellectual domains of knowledge. In this group of Reflexionen, the constitution of appearance (phaenomenon or apparentia) is presented as essentially grounded upon a fundamental relation of the faculties of sensibility and understanding. In Kant’s words: “[t]hat there are things in general which correspond to sensibility must be known by the understanding”. 22

Since “[…] understanding cannot determine anything in sensibility unless by means of a universal action”, the problem can be put in this question: “[…] through what does the appearance become intellectual?”. 23 In the Duisburg Nachlaß the answer to this question

18 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 5015) AA 18: 60. [1776-1778].
19 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 2247) AA 16: 285. [1771-1779].
20 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 4999) AA18: 56. [1776-1778].
21 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 251) AA 15: 95. [1771-1779]; (Reflexion 253) AA 15: 95. [1771-1779].
22 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 4773) AA 17: 639. [1773-1775].
23 Kant, Refl. (Reflexion 4684) AA 17: 671. [1773-1775].
would be given in the guarantee that everything which appears (was erscheint) in the sensible faculty could only be understood as under a concept of the intellectual faculty.

This position presents a radical rupture with the Dissertation’s position, according to which the determination of appearance and the limitation of the sensible world would be given merely by sensibility. Notwithstanding this rupture and Kant’s “draft” of the critical solution in the Duisburg Nachlaß, this solution would only be provided in the following decade. It would rely on the argument that holds “[…] the most important investigations for getting to the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use”. 24

5. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show that Kant’s pre-critical philosophy already held a fundamental distinction to be assured in his critical enterprise, namely, between the concepts of appearance (Erscheinung) and illusion (Schein). Throughout his correspondence established with Lambert, Kant structures important elements of his critical approach of the problem. 25

As it was pointed out, Lambert took the transition from illusion (Schein) to truth (Wahrheit) to be the seminal task of philosophy. In a critical-retrospective view, Lambert’s proposal makes itself readable as follows: “[a]lready from the earliest days of philosophy, apart from the sensible beings or appearances [Erscheinungen] (phaenomena) that constitute the sensible world, investigators of pure reason have thought of special intelligible beings (noumena), which were supposed to form an intelligible world; and they have granted reality to the intelligible beings alone, because they took appearance [Erscheinung] and illusion [Schein] to be one and the same thing”. 26

Moreover, it was argued that Kant’s pre-critical approach presents two indispensable steps for moving away from Lambert’s proposal: (i.) the consideration of the sensible and intellectual domains of knowledge as essentially distinct; (ii.) the assurance of a fundamental relation between them. Despite the fact that these two steps are presented as elements of the same assurance, i.e., the impossibility of following Lambert’s methodological proposal, one considers that Kant lacked, in the 1770s, the seminal argument for its accomplishment. This argument would be given in his critical proposal. Now, this proposal makes itself readable as follows: “[…] it is greatly mistaken that these principles of mine, because they make sensory representations into appearances [Erscheinungen], are supposed, in place of truth of experience, to transform sensory

24 Kant, KrV, A XVII. Translation is my own.
25 Notwithstanding the fact that he is primarily interested in contrasting the literature and not devoted to a systematic consideration of Lambert’s and Kant’s own works, as I intended to do in this paper, I would follow Peters (1968, p. 453) on his statement that: “Wenn man Lambert auch nicht als direkten ‘Vorläufer’ Kants betrachten will, so geht dennoch aus Kants Äußerung über ihn und aus Lamberts eigenem Bemühen eindeutig hervor, daß Lambert als Kant ähnlicher, im gleichen Sinne strebender Denker gesehen werden muß und zu den wichtigen Anregern für Kant gehört”.
26 Kant, Prol, AA 04: 314.
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representations into mere illusion [Schein], that, on the contrary, my principles are the only means of avoiding the transcendental illusion [transcendental Schein] by which metaphysics has always been deceived and thereby tempted into the childish endeavor of chasing after soap bubbles, because appearances [Erscheinungen], which after all are mere representations, were taken for things in themselves”.

Peculiar to the critical proposal is the establishment of the foundation of knowledge from the concept of appearance (Erscheinung or phaenomenon) as the constitutive determination of the domain of experience by the faculty of understanding. The denial of a place to the concept of illusion (Schein) within the critical enterprise does not follow from this. On the other hand, transcendental illusion (transcendentalen Schein) characterizes precisely the situation to which the faculty of reason is led in the undetermined field that immediately results from the determination of appearances (Erscheinungen) by the faculty of understanding. Yet, how the concepts of “appearance” and “illusion” are in fact justified in the critical enterprise would be a task for another investigation. I aimed, in this paper, at presenting the genesis of their distinction.

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27 Kant, Prol, AA 04: 292.
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